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Abstract
This thesis is an exploration of the writings of the 20th century German
philosopher Martin Heidegger to understand what thinking is and how thinking
needs to be undertaken I examine Heidegger s commitments to phenomenology in his
early writings, his revaluation of the meaning of truth in traditional Western
metaphysics, his criticism of calculative thinking and scientific rationality, his diagnosis
of the human alienation and homelessness, and his evocation of the redemptive power
of art and poetry through which we can find our place in the world. By questioning
through all these themes, I attempt to trace Heidegger s path towards a deeper and a
more original kind of thinking that remains largely ignored in traditional philosophical
inquiry.

Introduction
Marin Heidegger delivered a number of lectures to his students in the summer
and winter semesters of 1951 and 1952 at the University of Freiburg. The lectures were
compiled into a volume titled What is Called Thinking? In it, Heidegger makes a peculiar
statement: Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not
thinking.1 What does he mean by we are still not thinking

It sounds completely

counterintuitive, especially because that decade saw a great many advances in thinking.
For example, that very same year, the structure of the DNA molecule, which contained
the genetic information of how organisms survive, grow, and reproduce, was
discovered. Two years before, in 1950, Bertrand Russell was awarded the Nobel Prize
for his great legacy in philosophy and his social activism. In 1957, the Soviet Union
launched a first artificial satellite Sputnik 1 into Earth s orbit; and in a little more than a
decade later, in 1969, Americans landed on the moon. In the same decade, we saw great
works such as Samuel Beckett s Waiting for Godot J D Salinger s The Catcher in the Rye,
Elie Wiesel s Night, and many more. All of them are products of thinking. So, when
Heidegger says that we are still not thinking who is the we that he is talking
about? Do the people that I listed above count as ones who were still not thinking

Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper
& Row Publishers, 1968), p. 6.
1
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Does his assessment apply to 1950? More interesting is the question: does it apply
seventy years later in 2020?
Moreover, why is the mid-20th century a thought provoking time for
Heidegger? Could it be said that early 21st century is also thought-provoking? If so, the
same could certainly be said about every decade, every year, and every moment in
history. But if every moment in history has been thought-provoking and we have never
been thinking in the way Heidegger qualifies as thinking then Heidegger statement
becomes an empty riddle purported to shock the reader rather than actually describe
the state of affairs. This might be true. Nonetheless, he is making that statement
carefully and deliberately. I do not think that he is saying that we are not thinking at all
nor that we are no longer thinking. It is implicit in the statement that if something is
thought-provoking or provokes our thought it means that thinking must already be
underway. Nothing would be thought-provoking if we were already not capable of
thinking. Just as nothing would be sightworthy if we were already not capable of
seeing. Therefore, Heidegger does believe that we are capable of thinking and we have
been thinking, but we have not been doing it in the right way. Then the question
remains: what does it mean to think, according to Heidegger?
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The most direct hint is given in his essay The Question Concerning

Technology

where he says Questioning is the piety of thought

2

How we ask

questions determines how we think; and if we cannot ask questions, we cannot think.
The institutions of science, economics, politics, psychology, sociology, etc. all ask
questions and have been be asking questions for generations, and thus, have thought
throughout. But for Heidegger, the thinking that has prevailed in all of those
disciplines, as well as in philosophy, has been led astray; thinking has forgotten its way
along with its beginnings. My thesis is an attempt to understand why Heidegger thinks
so and why this question of thinking applies to this decade just as it did to the previous
ones. For this I will focus mostly on Heidegger s later writings as well as this some of
his early ones such as his seminal Being and Time, where he anticipates some of the
thinking that becomes explicit in his later writings.
In Chapter 1 I will explore Heidegger s early philosophy commitment to truth
as unconcealment as opposed to truth as correctness, the way of being in the world
through understanding and interpreting that he sketches out in Being and Time, and the
different levels in which we are involved in language, namely the hermeneutic logos and
the apophantic logos. In Chapter 2, I will address his criticism of the view of nature
defined by traditional metaphysics, his conjecture that science is inherently

Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology in The Question Concerning Technology, and Other
Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 35.
2
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representational and grounded in calculative objectivity, and his evaluation of the
essence of technology. In Chapter 3, I will explore why he thinks metaphysical thinking,
which gives rise to science, overlooks the fundamental relationship between humans
and the world. That relationship is undermined by objectification and a calculative
understanding of things in the world, and thus makes us alienated from our origins and
leaves us homeless. But our sense of place can be reclaimed by what Heidegger calls
meditative or contemplative thinking In Chapter 4, I examine Heidegger s attempt
to reestablish our sense of place in the world by thinking poetically. Ultimately, this
thesis is my attempt to understand Heidegger s path towards thinking and also to give
an answer to the question: how should we think?

Chapter 1: The Grounding of Heidegger s Early Philosophy

1. Truth and the Phenomenological Method

What do we mean when we talk about truth

Is it about whether a proposition

is true or false? For Heidegger, we cannot ponder this question objectively for we do not
have an objective and detached relationship with the world. But what about scientific
objectivity? Does Heidegger believe that there can be no scientific truths? Not quite.
Heidegger thinks that the abstractions in scientific objectivity skip over our more
original and ordinary subjective relationship to the world

that any assertion of

objectivity presupposes a subjectivity. Still, the kind of talk that relies on the subjectobject distinction comes with a historical background that purposefully categorizes
human beings as subjects and things in the world as objects. Thus, it separates lived
experience into a two-fold artificial abstraction, which is why the question of truth is
not adequately expressed in the metaphysical traditions of the West. Heidegger says,
Philosophy must perhaps start from the subject and return to the subject in its
ultimate questions and yet for all that it may not pose its questions in a one-sidedly

Budha
subjectivistic manner

6
1

He was suspicious of the subjectivistic philosophies that put the

ego-subject on the pedestal of knowledge and consciousness. Even his mentor Edmund
Husserl, in developing the phenomenology that Heidegger champions, gave an
overemphasis on consciousness and ego-subject [which] were signs that Husserl
remained with the Cartesians

2

For Heidegger, we are not first of all beings (as

subjects) prior to the world (of objects). We are not distanced beings looking out into the
world but we are already in it, feeling, breathing, walking, etc.; we are worldly
creatures.3 This worldliness must come forth by pondering the meaning of Da-sein,
which for Heidegger is the essential mode of our existence. Dasein [Da in German is
there and sein is being

defies the metaphysical abstraction of the world as a

detached subject and acknowledges the always already being-there of existence. In this
way, the question of truth arrives at the question of ontology, our relationship to the
world as existing beings, and these questions need to be approached in the right way
through being grounded in a phenomenological framework.

Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1982), p. 155.
2 Michael E. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self The Developments of Heidegger s Concept of Authenticit
Revised
Edition. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1986, p. 23; also cf. Heidegger in Basic Problems p 125 Husserl
refers constantly to this distinction, and precisely in the form in which Descartes expressed it: res
cogitans res extensa.
3 Cf. Karsten Harries: The difficulty with talk about subject and object is that it tends to take the self out of
the world, placing it before the world as a spectator stands before a picture in which he has no place (in
"Fundamental Ontology" in Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy [New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1978], p. 88).
1
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At its root, a phenomenon is a showing-itself-in-itself [that] signifies a distinctive

way in which something can be encountered.

4

It is a subjective mode of experiencing

entities in the world through attending to how they reveal themselves to us. For
instance, the feeling of melancholy about a profound loss shows itself the way it is as an
experienced phenomenon within ourselves. It is not experienced as a mere
neurochemical process within our body. Phenomenon is to be distinguished from
appearance, which does not mean showing-itself; it means rather the announcing itself
by something which doesn t show itself but which announces itself through something
which does show itself

5

Appearance is a distancing of the experiencing subject from a

more primordial way of encountering the world. When the human being becomes a
detached subject, then the world appears; we are not in the world but outside of it.
The question of truth can be approached phenomenologically once we attend to
how truth shows itself and gets encountered by subjects. For Heidegger, truth is not
simply a thing that stands as a free-floating object that is to be grasped by knowing
beings. The traditional definition of truth that starts with Plato has its bearings on the
correctness true and false of the statements Plato says And those that say of the
things that are that they are, are true, while those that say of the things that are that they

Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Perennial
Modern Classics, 2008), p. 54.
5 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 52.
4
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are not are false

6

A statement is true if it corresponds to the state of affairs that it is

supposed to describe. With Aquinas there is more standard metaphysical definition of
truth

veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. This can be taken to mean: truth is the

correspondence of the matter to knowledge

7

This version presides even in the modern

tradition throughout Descartes and Russell.8 The statement A door is a rectangular
aperture is true because it correctly describes what we mean by the idea of a door;
the statement is in accord with our knowledge of what a door is. This is truth as
correctness (Richtigkeit), a truth that makes a naive assumption that things are just
there waiting to be discovered

The untruth of the proposition (incorrectness) is the

nonaccordance of the statement with the matter

9

The statement A door is a wall is

untrue because it is not in accord with the matter of what a door is Truth here is a
relation of agreement

10

The agreement of something with something has the formal

Plato, Cratylus in The Complete Works of Plato, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 385b2, p. 105; cf. his statement in Sophist 263b p 287 And the
true one says those that are as they are about you And the false one says things different from those that
are. Aristotle also has a similar formulation in his Metaphysics, Book Gamma Well falsity is the
assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is and truth is the assertion that that which is is
and that that which is not is not Aristotle Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred. London: Penguin
Books, 1998, p. 107).
7 Martin Heidegger
On the Essence of Truth in Pathmarks, ed. by William H. McNeill (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 138.
8 Rene Descartes
Letter to Mersenne 16 October 1639 in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3,
Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1991 pp 139 I have never had any doubts about truth
because it seems a notion so transcendentally clear that nobody can be ignorant of it that the word
truth in the strict sense denotes the conformity of thought with its object and Bertrand Russell
Problems of Philosophy Oxford Oxford University Press 2001 p 75 Thus a belief is true when there is a
corresponding fact and is false when there is no corresponding fact
9 Heidegger
On the Essence of Truth p 139
10 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 258.
6
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character of a relation of something to something. Every agreement, and therefore
truth as well is a relation

11

But what lets this relation be in the first place?

Heidegger thinks that there needs to be something more primordial that lets this
relational truth, that distinguishes truth and falsity in a proposition, exist. It is a process
of revealing that needs to be encountered. The proposition is not the place where truth
first becomes possible but the reverse The proposition is possible only within truth

12

Heidegger calls this truth that makes the propositional truth possible unconcealment
(Unverborgenheit); unconcealment is the ontological condition of truth conventionally
understood that is as correctness or correspondence with entities
the terms unconcealment and truth

13

Heidegger uses

Wahrheit) interchangeably in his early writings,

but in his 1929 essay On the Essence of Truth he prefers to use the Greek term aletheia
instead of truth

in much of his later writings truth is reserved for the traditional

notion of correctness, and Dasein's disclosedness and discursive articulation of beings
are no longer considered to be true but rather ground the possibility of the truth and
falsity of assertions or representations

14

He says, to translate this word aletheia] as

Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 258.
Martin Heidegger, Logic: The Question of Truth, trans. Thomas Sheehan (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2010), p. 113.
13 Taylor Carman, Heidegger s Anal tic Interpretation Discourse and Authenticit in Being and Time (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 259.
14 Gary Steiner, "Heidegger's Reflection of Aletheia" in Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 13, No.1,
Winter 1986, pp. 38-50.
11
12
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is to cover up the meaning of what the Greeks made self-evidently basic for

the terminological use of aletheia as a pre-philosophical way of understanding it

15

Aletheia or unconcealment is the more primary form of disclosure of any truth of
propositions, and it gives rise to the directive to rethink the ordinary concept of truth
in the sense of the correctness of statements and to think it back to that still
uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings

16

In this formulation

truth

is what gets un-concealed or disclosed and untruth is what gets concealed or coveredover. The hiddenness of things in the world is more primary than the unhiddenness for
beings. Heidegger says the concealment of beings as a whole, untruth-proper, is older
than every opened-ness of this or that being

17

For there to be any truth there needs to

be the untruth of things that are not opened up yet. A grasping of truth from one
perspective simultaneously keeps other truths hidden. 18 Because we are finite beings
there cannot be a total unconcealment and no philosophical questioning can lead to a
transcendent knowledge. Yet, the more rigorous the questioning is, the more the

Heidegger, Being and Time p 262 also cf Heidegger s remark in The End of Philosophy and the Task
of Thinking
t o raise the question of aletheia, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the
question of truth. For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to call aletheia in the sense of opening,
truth in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh. [New York: Harper & Row, 1972], p. 70); also his
essay Hegel and the Greeks
if the essence of truth that straightaway comes to reign as correctness and
certainty can subsist only within the realm of unconcealment, then truth indeed has to do with Aletheia,
but not Aletheia with truth in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998], p. 334).
16 Heidegger
On the Essence of Truth p 144
17 Ibid., p. 148.
18 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good & Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Vintage, 1989), where he bluntly rejects the idea of an objective standpoint towards the
knowledge of truths and affirms that truth is always limited by a certain perspective.
15
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unconcealment will let truth unfold. Ernst Tugendhat criticized Heidegger s use of
unconcealment in talking about truth saying

if one limits oneself to the two

concepts un-concealment and concealment, there remains absolutely no possibility of
determining the specific sense of falsehood, and therefore also of truth

19

However,

Heidegger did not mean to supplant the idea of propositional truth that deals with the
true and false the assertions with the idea of truth as unconcealment, but simply to
inform that this underlying unconcealment or aletheia, is what allows propositional truth
to take shape.20 In the following remarks, I will discuss how the idea of truth as
unconcealment comes to fore by exploring Heidegger s concepts of understanding
interpretation

and discourse to arrive at his description of logos, the sense-making

of the world around us through language.

2. Understanding and Interpretation

A. Understanding

Heidegger says the act of making-sense or understanding is directed primarily
not to individual things and to general concepts Instead it is alive in one s first hand

Ernst Tugendhat Heidegger s Idea of Truth in Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments Volume 3.
Christopher Macann (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 85.
20 For a more detailed view on this phenomenon of unconcealment, see Mark Wrathall, Unconcealment
in A Companion to Heidegger, Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (eds.) (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing Ltd., 2005); Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Heidegger s Concept of Truth (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001); Gary Steiner, "Heidegger's Reflection of Aletheia" in Auslegung: A Journal of
Philosophy, Volume 13, No.1, Winter 1986, pp. 38-50.
19
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lived world and in one s world as a whole In this act of sense-making, the world is
opened up for existence

21

Understanding is not first of all theoretical or an alien

entity with which we make sense of the world. It is an activity that is lived and
encountered in the world that subjects find themselves in. It is taking hold of the world
as it comes to the immediate experience of practical life and understanding ourselves
and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of

22

Understanding is the way we make sense of entities by dealing with things available
for use in everyday practical activity. Understanding means knowing how, and it
precedes and makes possible cognition, or knowing that.

23

It is the way we interact with

entities in the world. The ordinary objects in the world are not simply substances with
properties, and we do not encounter them in the way that the traditional ontology
might suggest. The fundamental ontology proposed by Heidegger attempts to
overcome this deficiency by giving more careful attention to the many different modes
in which man exists and encounters things. Its goal is the exhibition of the structures
constitutive of human being (Dasein

24

We do not simply perceive the world around

us; as Heidegger says No matter how sharply we just look at the outward
appearance of things in whatever form this takes we cannot discover anything

Heidegger, Logic, p. 126.
Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I.
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 61.
23 Carman, Heidegger s Anal tic, p. 207.
24 Harries
Fundamental Ontology p 67
21
22
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available

25

Our access to the world is not granted by staring at it but by being involved

with it practically.
A hammer is not simply an object of perception with properties of hardness and
rigidity. It is something to hit with, maybe to flatten a surface or to thrust a nail; it is a
piece of equipment (Zeug in a broad enough sense to include whatever is useful: tools,
materials toys clothing dwellings etc

26

Equipmentality is the most basic way of

being involved with the world and understanding our context of existence in the web of
meanings relating to the equipment.27 Equipment is in order to

28

It is directed

towards accomplishing something; it is directed towards the future. The use of a plow is
what gives the farmer a context to his mode of being in the world and accomplishing
the task of harvesting crops and sustaining his livelihood. Equipment is something
available to use or ready-to-hand

zuhanden) and not something theoretical that is

potentially available to use or present-at-hand

vorhanden). When one makes sense of

the hammer one sees the hammer as an object ready-to-hand. Carman adds even less
is a human being a mere object with mental properties added on, but a doer and a

Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 98.
Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p. 62.
27 This notion of equipment is related to his discussion of technology in his later writings, where the form
of equipment takes a new essence with more technical involvement with things Harries says Heidegger
later came to see that technological equipment cannot be understood as just another, perhaps more
complex, tool. With technology the ontology of objectivity, which, on Heidegger's account, has to uproot
and dislocate the individual has entered everyday existence
Fundamental Ontology p 73 emphasis
added).
28 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 292.
25
26
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sufferer, an agent and a patient, not a what but a who, not something with extra
psychological features in addition but someone living a life, emerging from a history
and plunging into a future

29

For Heidegger, thinking of entities and beings as objects

with properties is an impoverished way of experiencing the richness of the boundless
phenomena surrounding us. However, this way of thinking is very useful whenever we
are devising scientific theories about the world or when treating someone for disease or
when there is an equipmental failure. In all of these cases, the object necessarily has to
be present-at-hand and is no longer accessible as ready-to-hand but only theoretically.
In anything ready-to-hand the world is always already there

30

In anything present-

at-hand the world is there as a pure presence without any relation to beings and is not
already there but needs to be processed theoretically to get hold of it. When nature,
which

stirs and strives which assails us and enthralls us as landscape

is thought as

present-at-hand in the metaphysical tradition, it remains essentially hidden from
beings. We lose touch with its phenomenon and its essence remains concealed. 31
B. Interpretation

When we engage with the world that is ready-to-hand by understanding it in
terms of a totality of involvements we can then interpret it more explicitly and find

Carman in Foreword to Being and Time, xv.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 114.
31 I will discuss more about the conception of nature in traditional metaphysics in Chapter 2.
29
30
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meaning.32 Heidegger says all interpretation is grounded on understanding That
which has been articulated as such an interpretation and sketched out beforehand and
understanding in general as something articulable is the meaning

33

Interpretation

[Auslegung] can occur only when there is already an understanding; and meaning
emerges when interpretation, grounded in understanding, gets worked out or
articulated. Only in interpretation can meaning become explicit and thematized in the
present. It tries to make sense out of what was given in the past by our contingency or
thrownness and what we seek to accomplish in the future as projected by our
understanding. Interpretation is where choices are made on the basis of meanings that
have previously been disclosed for us. As understanding takes hold of the past or the
givenness of what was already there and seeks to actualize the possibilities in the
future, interpretation grounds it in the present and makes sense of the possibilities of
understanding. Interpretation does not change or skew the understanding but simply
actualizes it in the present.
Heidegger adds that which is disclosed in understanding

that which is

understood is already accessible in such a way that its as which can be made to stand
out explicitly The as makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is
understood It constitutes the interpretation

Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 191.
Ibid., p. 195.
34 Ibid., p. 189.
32
33

34

Interpretation has a structure of

Budha
something as something.

16
35

But it is not a representation of the thing out there, waiting to be

discovered and decoded Because understanding itself isn t always explicit and
thematic, the interpretation has to present it as something that is explicit

In

interpreting we do not throw a signification over some naked thing which is presentat-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is
encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is
disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets
laid out by interpretation

36

By the time we encounter the world, things are already

suffused with values and nothing is neutral. In interpreting the world, we process those
values surrounding us and attribute them to the things as they show themselves to us,
as our Dasein sees them. Understanding provides context to interpretation.37 If someone
understands the hammer as something to hit a nail, then they can interpret the hammer
in its different possibilities

namely, hitting a nail on a wall to put up a picture or to fix

a broken cupboard, or to build a new doghouse, etc. But if someone understands it
merely as something that is heavy and rigid and uses it as a paperweight or as a
decoration in an aquarium, then they are simply thematizing it as a present-at-hand
object that has no essential relationship to the lived world. Yet, this is not to say that the

Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 189.
Ibid., p. 190-1.
37 See Carman, Heidegger s Anal tic p 210
kind of showing how.
35
36

If understanding is knowing how, interpretation must be a
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present-at-hand properties of the hammer are irrelevant its objective weight and
form can inform us about how to use it in different contexts. There is a place for
scientific objectivity but the problem is only when that objectivity takes precedence over
our thinking about our more essential involvement with the world.38

3. Discourse and Logos

Even though interpretation is how understanding becomes explicit, that
explicitness can be shown and communicated only through language. Heidegger holds
that only because and insofar as things are revealed practically can they be revealed
linguistically. Practical truth is a necessary condition for semantic truth, but not vice
versa

39

Practical involvement precedes all linguistic articulation, but this is not to be

misconstrued with the empiricist position where sense experience is theorized into
linguistic abstractions; the empiricist still believed in objective sense perceptions that
can be translated into concepts.40 Moreover, the conception of language in the

Dreyfus says In the natural sciences shared scientific background skills are necessary for deworlding
nature and for testing theories, but these skills do not determine what is to count as the objects of the
theory The scientists background skills function precisely to free the science s objects from dependence
on all practices, including the practices that reveal them They thus reveal incomprehensible nature
and deworlded relations between deworlded data (Being-in-the-World, p. 207).
39 Mark Okrent s remark quoted in Dahlstrom Heidegger s Concept of Truth p. 199.
40 While empiricists such as Hume are right that one should not attempt to make assertions that go
beyond the realm of experience, they are still misguided about how we encounter things. For Hume,
things in the world are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each
other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement Hume David A
Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978], p. 252). The bundles of
perceptions are objectified in the empiricist tradition, which is not what phenomenologists like Heidegger
conform to.
38
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structuralist tradition is not adequate in capturing the way Heidegger thinks of it. When
Saussure says
sound-image

The linguistic sign unites not a thing and a name but a concept and a
41

Dasein disappears; the connection, the link between language and the

world becomes completely abstracted. Looking through language becomes nothing
other than looking into the mirror; language becomes limited as self-consciousness. This
thinking once again highlights the subjectivist approach that Heidegger is trying to
move away from. To have language is to speak.42 It is to convey and point things out; it is
an act, a doing.
Heidegger uses the term discourse

Rede) to describe this underlying

meaningful act of communication that is underway in interpretation

Discourse is the

Articulation of intelligibility. Discourse underlies interpretation and assertion. What can
be articulated in interpretation, thus even more primordially in discourse, we have
called meaning

43

The communicability of understanding is the basis for things to

make sense and be intelligible. For meaning to arise, it cannot rest in understanding; it
has to be articulated through the discursive mode. Discourse is the condition of
interpretation, and of linguistic acts generally Each discourse all discursivity
Heidegger

says

has in itself the possibility of giving something meaningful, something that

Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2011), p. 66.
42 Martin Heidegger
Language in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York:
Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 188.
43 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 205.
41
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we understand

indeed discourse and language constitutes precisely this dimension

of understandability, of mutual expression, requesting, desiring, asking, telling.

44

Discourse in ordinary language facilitates a mutual understanding between different
individuals.
For the ancient Greeks the word logos signified meaningful discourse
Heidegger says logos, as discourse means what we understand by language, yet it also
means more than our vocabulary taken as a whole. It means the fundamental faculty of
being able to talk discursively and accordingly to speak

45

Logos is a discursive

language that make s manifest what one is talking about in one s discourse
something be seen, namely, what the discourse is about

46

it lets

It is a vehicle for bringing

things out of unconcealment, as it lets something be seen as something. It is not simply
about producing sounds or symbols but rather as an engagement with things in a
meaningful way. Heidegger, however, has a quite different approach to logos than the
Greeks at its most fundamental level the hermeneutic level logos is a ready-to-hand
articulation and sharing of meaning or significance, while [Heidegger] argues that the
Greeks implicitly conceived the logos as a present-at-hand succession of words

47

Any

kind of revealing happens in logos and in communicative language; without it things

Martin Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill
and Nicolas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 306.
45 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 305.
46 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 56.
47 Steiner
Heidegger s Reflection of Aletheia, p 43
44
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remained hidden

Those who are lacking in understanding are contrasted with the

logos, and also with him who speaks that logos and understands it
are lacking in understanding, what they do remains hidden

But to those who

lethein. They forget it; that

is, for them it sinks back into hiddenness. Thus, to the logos belongs unhiddenness alethein

48

Here one can once again see Heidegger s commitment to the idea of truth as

the phenomenon of unconcealment and untruth as that of concealment. The truth of
logos brings entities to be encountered and uncovered in language; but untruth of logos
covers it up by deception by putting something in front of something and thereby
passing it off as something which it is not.

49

Moreover, just as there are two distinct phenomena of sense-making,
understanding and interpretation, logos also has two distinct structures that take part in
unconcealment, namely the hermeneutic as and the apophantic as. The as is a relational
structure that cannot exist on its own and functions in a way that makes it possible to
relate things in a meaningful way.50 The hermeneutic as is the primary form of
disclosure that has the fullness of meanings in the everyday practical context This

as

is the structure of understanding. The understood is a hermeneia, that-which-isunderstood in an understanding and understanding is a basic comportment of

Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 262.
Ibid., p. 57.
50 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 288: Yet we immediately recognize that the 'as'
signifies a 'relation' and that the 'as' is never given independently on its own. It points to something which
stands in the 'as', and equally it points to some other thing, as which it is.
48
49
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existence. Therefore, the structure of the as is the fundamental hermeneutical structure
of the being of that being which we call existence human life

51

This hermeneutic

understanding is how we get acquainted to our own basic existence; our own ontology
becomes accessible to us in the hermeneutic as . Things are experienced as ready-tohand in the totality of the context surrounding them So, a door is first understood as
handy or as being used as an exit in the hermeneutic as before one can make an
assertion This door is an exit

which employs the apophantic as. 52 This apophantic logos

is fundamentally derivative of hermeneutic logos.
The apophantic as of assertion is essentially a pointing out of objects in the
world that have already been disclosed in context in the hermeneutic as. It is letting
what is at hand be seen as such in theory through a propositional statement 53 It brings
things into view outside of their ordinary contexts as theoretical objects that are able to
be grasped. Heidegger says The essence of a proposition is apophainestai

showing a

thing apo: in terms of itself. The meaning of an assertion as a form of speech is to show
(deloun something as
the door as an exit

54

In the proposition The door is an exit

what gets shown is

a place that lets one leave the room But a door could also be

Heidegger, Logic, p. 127. The word hermeneia was first introduced to philosophy in Aristotle s work Peri
Hermeneias (translated as De Interpretatione) where Aristotle gives logical forms of categorical
propositions. The word also has its roots in Hermes the messenger god in Greek mythology who was
responsible for mediating communication between gods and humans and revealing as well as concealing
truths.
52 Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Heidegger s Concept of Truth New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 191.
53 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 319.
54 Heidegger, Logic, p. 112.
51
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something that lets one enter the room. But the statement lets us see the door as an
exit only by narrowing down the field of meanings provided by the more primordial
hermeneutic involvement, which might be that the person uttering the proposition
might be inside the room and not outside. It is the most explicit form of revealing, but it
is limited in its scope Heidegger adds

apophansis, the fundamental accomplishment of

the logos, is a bringing into view of beings in how and what they are as beings

55

It

points out beings in the world as they show themselves in understanding through
assertions but it never brings us primarily and in general before those beings that are
revealed. Rather the converse is the case: the blackboard must already have become
manifest to us as such a being in order for us to assert something about it in pointing
out

56

This way the interpretive hermeneutic as precedes any sort of propositional

understanding of the world and is grounded phenomenologically in discourse.
The hermeneutic disclosure has a similar dimension to the unconcealment of
truth as aletheia. The propositional truth as correctness is always already dependent on
the more primary disclosure in the phenomenon of unconcealment. We first experience
objects in the world as ready-to-hand involvement rather than as a present-at-hand
abstractions. These commitments are central to Heidegger s understanding of our mode
of being in the world and through this rethinking of the traditional conceptions of

55
56

Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 320.
Ibid., p. 340.
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Being, truth, understanding, interpretation, and logos, Heidegger hints us toward a new
path of questioning about our relationship with the world.57

Cf this remark by Holger Zaborowski about the role of hermeneutic understanding Moreover insofar
as this kind of hermeneutics is not concerned with practical advice it is also prior to all practical
philosophy (be it an ethics of virtue, an ethics of moral obligation, or any other kind of ethics) even
though it is in a much deeper and more primordial sense a distinctive practice of one s own life that is
the practice of self-awakening which requires a certain independence from others in order freely to think
to interpret oneself for oneself
Heidegger s hermeneutics towards a new practice of
understanding in Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays, ed. Daniel Dahlstrom [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011], p. 24).
57

Chapter 2: Against Technology

1. The Position of Nature in Modernity

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant talks about the human

as the sole

being on earth who has reason, and thus the capacity to set voluntary ends [telos] for
himself, he is certainly the titular lord of nature, and, if nature is regarded as a
teleological system then it is his vocation to be the ultimate end of nature

1

With the

absence of God and religiosity in the modern philosophical approach, humans become
the only ones remaining who are capable of creating values in nature

which is in itself

a value-neutral mechanism. In the hierarchy of autonomous beings, apart from the gods
and angels, humans reign the highest among all the animals, plants, and the rest of the
embodiments in nature. So naturally, humans have to be the sovereigns of nature, those
that govern and dictate all the ends suitable to an inert world. Kant is among many who
idealized this anthropocentric understanding of our relationship to nature, where we
are put on a pedestal as higher beings whose vocation, as it turns out, is really to pursue
ends of nature at the service of humans but not necessarily ends of nature by itself. So,

Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, translated by Paul Guyer and Eric
Matthews (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 298.
1
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in a peculiar way, the ends of nature become means to the ends of humans. Hans Jonas
highlights this point even more clearly as he says, if nature is mere object and in no
sense subject if it is devoid of will then man remains the sole subject and the sole
will

And the will of course is a will for power over things The heavens no longer

declare the glory of God but the materials of nature are ready for the use of man

2

Thus, the world is always at our disposal. 3
Hans Jonas is an important figure in discussing Heidegger s philosophical
commitments. Jonas studied under Heidgger at the University of Marburg in the 1920s
and later became a prominent thinker in his own right. Much of his writings echo
Heidegger s thinking concerning the nature of being and technology. Like Heidegger,
Jonas also believed that modern science created a concept of theory that grants access
to the objective truths in nature.4 Jonas says

The very conception of reality that

underlay and was fostered by the rise of modern science, i.e., the new concept of nature,

Hans Jonas Seventeenth Century and After: The Meaning of the Scientific and Technological
Revolution in Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man, ed. L. E. Long (Atropos Press,
2010), p. 71.
3 Through the new philosophy of Descartes in his Discourse on the Method (trans. Ian Maclean [New York:
Oxford University Press 2006 p 51 humans can be the masters and possessors of nature a project
set out by Francis Bacon in his The New Organon Also cf Bacon s remark We intend at the end like
honest and faithful guardians) to hand men their fortunes when their understanding is freed from
tutelage and comes of age, from which an improvement of the human condition must follow, and greater
power over nature. For by the Fall man declined from the state of innocence and from his kingdom over
the creatures. Both things can be repaired even in this life to some extent, the former by religion and faith,
the latter by the arts and sciences. (The New Organon, Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (eds.) [New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000] in Book II, Aphorism 52, p. 221).
4 Heidegger talks about science as Wissenschaft, something distinct from episteme, doctrina and scientia, in
Age of the World Picture in The Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt (New York:
Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 117.
2
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contained manipulability at its theoretical core and, in the form of experiment, involved
actual manipulation in the investigative process

5

Experimentation presupposes

manipulability of variables acting in nature, thus providing hard truths about the
mechanisms and structures behind everything. In scientific investigation, objects and
processes in nature can be molded and transformed. But is this phenomenon unique to
science? Isn't tool making, which we have always done throughout human history, also
a kind of manipulation? Perhaps it is a matter of degree. Whereas it was the sharpening
of a stone in the Stone Ages, now it is the splitting of atoms and the changing of our
own genetic material. If the manipulation of natural objects in early humans was to
hunt for food, manipulation in modern science is for comprehensive knowledge of
nature as a whole Jonas makes an interesting point here

The very process of attaining

knowledge leads through manipulation of the things to be known, and this origin fits of
itself the theoretical results for an application whose possibility is irresistible

even to

the theoretical interest, let alone the practical, whether or not it was contemplated in the
first place

6

Science does not simply view things neutrally but imposes an ordering of

an interpretation that facilitates control over the object of its inquiry. Jonas poses a
problem for any endeavour that sets out to pursue knowledge for its own sake, because
he suspects that the fruits of the knowledge might be irresistible to pursue.

Jonas, Seventeenth Century and After in Philosophical Essays, p. 48.
Hans Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biological
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p. 205.
5
6
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Technological science is never simply contemplative and always geared towards the
practical application of its knowledge.
Moreover, Jonas believes that the core conviction of modern science was the
universality of laws behind the one neutral quantitative world stuff that could give
one uniform notion of reality.7 Wherever one goes, one can deduce how anything works
through particular laws discovered by modern science. Any phenomenon is reducible
to a set of basic laws These laws are the laws of mechanics and the idea of the world
machine arises It is to be noted that it preceded the machine age

8

The world becomes

a determinate mechanism guided by physical principles, and to our benefit it becomes
predictable and convenient. However, this is not to say that through science everything
is already determined or known. It might take a while, but it is likely that whatever can
be represented through scientific principles will eventually be known. He adds that
nature

as a great automatism of indifferent forces is devoid of even the most

unconscious bias toward goals, and of the formative power to serve it
formal causes are struck from its inventory and only efficient causes left

that final and
9

There is only

a movement from one moment to another guided by causes but there is no movement
to anything in particular There is no real intrinsic end to nature but only the one that
can be assigned to it by humans. If there is a certain direction that nature in its own

Jonas, Seventeenth Century and After in Philosophical Essays, p. 68.
Ibid.
9 Ibid., pp. 70, 67.
7
8
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right is heading towards, it has nothing to do with humans in that it does not have any
grand goal or purpose related to the human. The universe might expand, collapse, or
disintegrate, only because of cause-effect (efficient) relationships. Jonas effectively
summarizes this point

nature is not a place where one can look for ends Efficient

cause knows no preference of outcomes: the complete absence of final cause means that
nature is indifferent to distinctions of value. It cannot be thwarted because it has
nothing to achieve

10

So, what is the result of all this For Heidegger

the world now appears as an

object open to the attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able
any longer to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for
modern technology and industry

11

There is nothing normative about nature and all

norms are to be set by the titular lords who themselves have a vested interest in
harnessing all the manipulable forces in nature. The instrumental rationality that drives
science and technology views everything as means to an end and prioritizes the
accomplishing of the desired ends above anything else.12 Jonas says,
if nature sanctions nothing, then it permits everything. Whatever man does to it,
he does not violate an immanent integrity, to which it and all its works have lost
title. In a nature that is its own perpetual accident, each thing can as well be other
than it is without being any the less natural. Nature is not a norm (which to

Jonas, Seventeenth Century and After in Philosophical Essays, p. 69.
Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. by John M. Anderson and Hans Freund (New York: Harper &
Row, 1966), p. 50.
12 One can think of this in relation to the moral standpoint of Kant s Kingdom of Ends in Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:433 where beings are ought to be treated as ends and not simply as means.
10
11
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Aristotle it was and a monstrosity is as natural as any normal growth 13

There is no guiding morality that directs what ought to be done and how we are to act;
we are guided only by our own agency, which nature itself lacks. There is no
responsibility that is demanded by natural forces; and in the absence of God, there is no
one who can hold us accountable for what we do to nature. Nature doesn't owe us
anything and we don't owe anything to nature.

2. The Grounding of Science

In much of the later writings of Heidegger, there is a push against the supposed
goal of modern science to draw an objective map of reality. There are two important
features of modern science that Heidegger highlights: the exactness of its research and
its objectification of reality He says the rigor of mathematical physical science is
exactitude

14

The rigor of scientific research has to be based on how much the result of

the experiment adheres to what we already know about natural laws. Whatever is
found in experimentation must correspond to what Heidegger calls the ground plan of
nature
No motion or direction of motion is superior to any other. Every place is equal to
every other. No point in time has preference over any other. Every force is
defined according to i.e., is only its consequences in motion, and that means
in magnitude of change of place in the unity of time. Every event must be seen so
as to be fitted into this ground plan of nature. This projected plan of nature finds
Jonas Seventeenth Century and After in Philosophical Essays, p. 70.
Heidegger The Age of the World Picture in The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays,
trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 119.
13
14
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its guar-antee in the fact that physical research, in every one of its questioning
steps, is bound in advance to adhere to it. 15

This ground plan of nature does not allow any miracles in the physical world. The
function of science is to find theories that accurately map this ground plan so as to
denounce any miracles No event is inexplicable nor compatible with the ground plan
as long as science strictly adheres to its rigorous research. However, Heidegger says this
is not the case with humanistic sciences which must necessarily be inexact just in
order to remain rigorous

16

This is because there is no ground plan that is already laid

out about human life before the research is conducted. The research of humanistic
sciences is to be inexact enough in a hope that one might stumble upon knowledge
about human life. There is rarely a hierarchy about insights into humanity; as
Heidegger says No one would pre sume to maintain that Shakespeare s poetry is
more advanced than that of Aeschylus

17

Another feature of modern science is portrayed by the statement
theory of the real.

18

Science is the

Here, when Heidegger talks about the real he's talking about the real

as something that is representable or calculable

The real is an object that can be

known through scientific theories; they are objects are present-at-hand. In the most
straightforward way, science comes about from the real and is about the real; objectness

Heidegger The Age of the World Picture p 119
Ibid., p. 120.
17 Ibid., p. 117.
18 Science and Reflection
in The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt
(New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 157.
15
16
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is the prerequisite for scientific investigation. Heidegger says The real thus becomes
surveyable and capable of being followed out in its sequences. The real becomes
secured in its objectness. From this, there results spheres or areas of objects that
scientific observation can entrap after its fashion
science corresponds to the real

19

It is this] through which modern

Reality becomes a collective ordering of objects

according to the axioms of scientific truths. Any phenomenon that can be measured and
calculated can essentially be said to be real

but if it can t be detected as an object then

it is not real.
Heidegger arrives at the conclusion that science becomes representational
because of this focus on the objectness of reality

We first arrive at science as research

when and only when truth has been transformed into the certainty of representation.
What it is to be is for the first time defined as the objectiveness of representing, and
truth is first defined as the certainty of representing in the metaphysics of Descartes

20

The certainty that can be represented in a form of scientific objectivity is the hallmark of
the modern conception of truth and knowledge; such certainty cannot be found in art,
poetry, or in philosophical discourse. For science, the world is always there in its
determinate objective existence which makes the world a picture

Picture is a

Heidegger Science and Reflection p 168
Heidegger The Age of the World Picture p 127 This formulation of the minds objective
representation of the world is seen in Descartes Second Meditation. He says that the object like wax is
merely something extended flexible and changeable and the perception we have of it is not of vision
or touch or imagination but of purely mental scrutiny Descartes The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
Vol. II, pp. 20-1).
19
20
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representation, a copy of something so for Heidegger the world picture means the
world conceived and grasped as picture

21

When the world becomes picture it is set

before us and we are set before it. The picture becomes a structural image that
determines a specific kind of experience that humans have

namely, an experience

through representation [vorstellen]. Heiddeger adds,
man contends for the position in which he can be that particular being who
gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is. Because
this position secures, organizes, and articulates itself as a world view, the
modern relationship to that which is, is one that becomes, in its decisive
unfolding, a confrontation of world views. 22
For Heidegger, we give the measure in the way we map out the reality in the
Cartesian model and in the way we us the resulting knowledge for representing and
ordering the reality. Because of this, the modern scientific research inevitably leads to a
worldview where the human has conquered the world as picture. Ultimately, the
science as the theory of the real gives a representational understanding of reality while
at the same time revealing objective truths about the world as object
But science is clearly useful, and one can provide countless examples of how it
has been useful What is it useful for

The ultimate end of all use is the same as the end

of all activity, and this is twofold: preservation of life, and betterment of life that is,
promotion of the good life

23

Science is probably the best possible means for the

Heidegger The Age of the World Picture p 129
Ibid., p. 134.
23 Jonas
The Practical Uses of Theory p 191
21
22
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preservation of life but the latter depends on what one means by the good life Does
the good life mean a life that is more efficient, easier, or happier? There isn't really a
clear conception about any of these human states and the notion of the good life
remains vague, where the moral dimension of lived reality is left out. But if science is to
be justifiably useful it cannot neglect the question about ends Jonas says Faced with the
threat of catastrophe we may feel excused from inquiring into ends, since averting
catastrophe is a non-debatable first end suspending all discussion of ultimate ends

24

Technological science is obviously the most immediate rescue that is most likely to
succeed in preserving human life in a massive scale. But this is not always the normal
state of human existence. Even though we might face periods of emergency, there's
almost always room for reflection, time for assessing our possibilities, goals, and values.
The anticipation of success says Jonas inherent in all struggle against danger,
misery, and injustice must face the question of what life befits man when the emergency
virtues of courage charity and justice have done their work

25

If the questions about

ultimate ends are not appropriate during catastrophe, then, at the very least, they
should be reflected upon during periods of leisure and good health.

24
25

Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory p 208
Ibid., p. 209.
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3. The Technological Understanding

Throughout his later writings, there is burgeoning anxiety about technology in
Heidegger. At first glance, reading his criticism of technology feels like coming from a
disgruntled romantic who idolizes the simple non-technological lives of previous
generations. But a more sympathetic reading shows a deep concern on Heidegger s part
for understanding this new phenomenon of machine technology. Technology is
conventionally understood as means to an end

Even though this instrumental

definition of technology is quite plausible, for Heidegger, this could not be further from
the truth He says wherever ends are pursued and means are employed wherever
instrumentality reigns there reigns causality

26

If technology has to pursue an end,

then it has to be instrumental and hence be able to create effects through causes. The
fourfold causality [material, formal, final, and efficient] is the basis on which objects can
appear in the world. The making of a hammer requires the working of all the causes:
first, the materials required, then the form it needs to take, then determining for what
purpose it is being made for, and the effect of bringing forth the finished hammer. This
bringing-forth [Her-vor-bringen is grounded in revealing Bringing-forth, indeed,
gathers within itself the four modes of occasioning

causality

and rules them

Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology in The Question Concerning Technology, and Other
Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 6.
26
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throughout. Within its domain belong end and means, belongs instrumentality.
Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology

27

But

instrumental technology forgets the question of final causes (telos) and thus does not
have the sense of where it is going; it simply moves from one thing to the other so long
as the process yields useful results. The domain of instrumentality lacks a moral
dimension that guides and informs any kind of action. Equipment, as discussed in
Chapter 1, is a mode of revealing; but technological instruments no longer facilitate the
same way of relating to the world. The instruments have a dislocating effect on the user
where the user or the practitioner is no longer simply accomplishing the task at hand
but get swept away by the demands of what Heidegger calls enframing

Gestell). The

oil rig is a technological instrument, and not simply an equipment, that demands specific
actions from users that it extract the oil, refine it, and distribute it to the buyer.
Heidegger contextualizes this understanding of technology as a mode of
revealing in terms of the Greek origins from the word technikon, which belongs to the
root word techne
craftsman

Techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of the

says Heidegger

but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts Techne

belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis; it is something poietic. From earliest times until
Plato the word techne is linked with the word episteme. Both words are names for

27

Ibid., p. 12.
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knowing in the widest sense

28

It meant an active engagement in creating art and

revealing objects and truths through theory and practice. This conception of techne had
little to do with the manipulability of the objects and acts as a means to particular ends.
It was a mode of un-concealing where one could be in touch with truth of the physis
(nature); it was an activity of knowledge. But what about modern technology?
Heidegger says that this, too, is a way of revealing but one of challenging
[Herausfordern] which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy
that can be extracted and stored as such

29

This modern revealing challenges, provokes,

and demands the objects in nature and is no longer looking for an epistemic or poietic
engagement; it has no final ends that directs its actions.
That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked
what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is,
in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew

30

This

transformation of nature makes nature handy, and always ready to be harnessed
according to our will. Nature becomes standing-reserve
as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit.

31

the earth now reveals itself

When nature endures as

standing-reserve it is no longer seen as an object even; it is simply a congregation of

Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology p 13
Ibid., p. 14.
30 Ibid., p. 16.
31 Ibid., p. 14.
28
29
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forces that can be ordered, calculated, and used up as system of value-neutral
information. Standing-reserve is the way things get revealed when the mode of
revealing is enframing. Heidegger says The essence of modern technology shows itself
in what we call Enframing [Gestell

which is a gathering together that belongs to that

setting-upon which sets upon man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in the
mode of ordering, as standing-reserve

32

Enframing is the revealing of whatever can be

challenged-forth and ordered in nature. It restricts our whole way of understanding
nature and its constituent parts and allows to become visible only those things that are
already conditioned as standing-reserve.
Heidegger says, The world of science becomes a cybernetic world The
cybernetic blueprint of the world presupposes that steering or regulating is the most
fundamental characteristic of all calculable world-events

33

The world of machines

dominates us, not in a literal way as apocalyptic science fiction novels would have us
believe, but in a way that is more corrosive to our human nature. It does not annihilate;
it festers. Nowadays each competing worldview declares that its system of values best
promotes human life; that is, the life of the people of the nation promoting the
particular worldview Values become nothing more than the objectification of needs as

Ibid., pp. 23-4.
Heidegger The Provenance of Art and the Destination of Thinking, trans. Dimitrios Latsis in Journal
of the British Society of Phenomenology, 44:2, 119-128, p. 123. Originally translated from Die Herkunft Der
Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens Vortrag in Der Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste in
Athen 4. April 1967).
32
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goals

34

Even though our quality of life might be improving through this process of

need-based value formation, there is no moral direction that tells how we are to relate to
nature Heidegger gives a biting remark on this matter

The devastation of the earth

can easily go hand in hand with a guaranteed supreme living standard for man, and
just as easily with the organized establishment of a uniform state of happiness for all
men

35

It is not only things and places in nature but also people that can be revealed as
standing-reserve. The coal miners themselves could be just as standing-reserve as the
coal mining factory; thus, they could become alienated. It might be useful to think of
this phenomenon in relation to Karl Marx s essay Alienated Labor

where Marx

examines the reason why the human species is alienated in two folds: from nature and
from itself.36 Behind this alienation, he believes, is the process of political economy that
objectifies the product of the labor as well as the laborer. The laborer is subjected to
being a commodity that produces commodities, which then surpass the value of the
laborer that created it. The product as well as the activity stand completely foreign to

Zimmerman, Michael E, Eclipse of the Self The Developments of Heidegger s Concept of Authenticit (Athens:
Ohio University Press, 1986), Zimmerman, p. 221 also cf his remark on p 222 industrial society as an
authoritative subject and thinking as politics World wars are ways of shoring up faltering economies
wars provide the stability of a constant form of using things up Leaders of power-hungry nations are
not merely individuals caught up in the blind rage of a selfish egoism but are instruments of world
destiny
35 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1968), p. 30.
36 Karl Marx, Marx: Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.) (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc., 1994), p. 63.
34
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the worker and if this detachment from the activity itself pervades the majority of the
workers time and place the worker is reduced to a mere machine. The self is wasted in
a production and the relationship of the worker with his own being is severed. The
whole process of distancing the humans from nature, by classifying it as an object, as
well as from each other, like in the case of the rich and the working class, becomes a
barrier to the realization of human progress. Marx makes a compelling argument about
the present fact of the political economy that inevitably leads to the degradation of
the human spirit through alienation Marx says alienated labor hence turns the speciesexistence of man into an existence alien to him, into the means of his individual existence. It
alienates his spiritual nature, his human essence, from his own body and likewise from
nature outside him.

37

The process of political economy that employs the human agents

to an object production results in the split between the worker s own inner and outer
life. As the workers expend their energy and commitment to fulfilling the desires of the
capitalist, the reconciliation with their own freedom and their intimate connection with
the natural world becomes impossible. Marx s critique of the political economy
resonates with Heidegger s critique of instrumental rationality of technology. This is the
technological understanding of beings that both Marx and Heidegger think is so
pernicious about modernity, as it conveniently facilitates the exploitation and reduction
of everything in the world.

37

Ibid., p. 64.
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Nevertheless Heidegger contends that it would be foolish to attack technology

blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil

But suddenly

and unaware we find ourselves so firmly shackled to these technical devices that we fall
into bondage to them

38

Heidegger is not blatantly anti-technology nor does he believe

that doing away with technology or keeping it under a total control and directing it to
our rational ends would solve all the problems.39 He says we can use technical
devices, and yet with proper use also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may let go
of them any time

40

He thinks that our relationship to technology should be free and

independent, and should not gain total precedence over human life and human
relationships.41 Our comportment towards technology should be that of releasement
towards things which grants an openness for contemplation that is free from
Enframing. Heidegger was inspired by idea of releasement

Gelassenheit) in the

Medieval German theologian Meister Eckhart which means to forgo willing and let the
divine be present in one s soul. Heidegger says, So far as we can wean ourselves from
willing, we contribute to the awakening of releasement
for releasement.

42

or rather, to keeping awake

So long as we do not aim to impose the metaphysical structuring

Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 53-4.
Cf Dreyfus Hubert L Heidegger on Gaining a Free Relation to Technology in Heidegger Reexamined
Vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 163 on the discussion about the approaches of different philosophers
concerning this issue of rebelling or controlling technology.
40 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 54.
41 I will talk more about this idea of freedom in Chapter 3 and 4.
42 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, pp. 60-1.
38
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through a technological interpretation of the world, we become readier, or more awake,
for releasement, for suspending our willing.43 The real crisis would be when no such
releasement from technology can be accomplished

when technological thinking takes

over to bewitch dazzle and beguile us so much that calculative thinking may
someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking

44

The danger

does not just lie in technology itself; it lies in the complete subsumption of calculative
thought in the totality of human societies, which might completely shift our way of
thinking irreversibly.

This also resonates Schopenhauer s conception of the experience of art which entails the suspension of
willing. Art plucks the object of its contemplation from the stream of the world's course, and holds it
isolated before it It therefore pauses at this particular thing it stops the wheel of time for it the
relations vanish its object is only the essential the Idea Arthur Schopenhauer The World as Will and
Representation. Vol. I, trans. E. F. J. Payne [New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969], §36, 185). In the
experience of the world of Ideas we get a consolation for a brief moment and are lifted away from the
thralldom of the will Ibid 196 The art object prompts the subject of pure knowing to no longer be
conscious of its individuality and to attend to the Idea, and in doing so suspends the subject from the
tyranny of world will. I will also develop this idea of releasement as freedom and letting beings be in
Chapter 3 and 4.
44 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 56.
43

Chapter 3: A Thinking that Overcomes Metaphysics

1. The Critique of Metaphysical thinking

Heidegger traces the problem concerning technology and modern scientific
research to an underlying metaphysical understanding in Western philosophy. He
embraces Nietzsche s pronouncement

It is not the victory of science that distinguishes

our nineteenth century but the victory of scientific method over science

1

These

advocates of method are primarily Bacon, Descartes, Comte, and even Hegel, whose
methods were grounded in a predilection to put reality in order and concrete
objectivity. Nietzsche adds, One should not understand this compulsion to construct
concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws as if they enabled us to fix the real world; but as
a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in which our existence is made
possible
etc for us

we thereby create a world which is calculable, simplified, comprehensible,
2

In the pursuit of scientific objectivity, there is no such innocence, no

neutrality that aims to authentically understand our place in the universe. It is a selfcertain method of inquiry that does not want to examine its grounding assumptions
and its fundamental groundedness in lived phenomena. Heidegger says,

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York:
Vintage Books, 1968) Aphorism 466.
2 Ibid., Aphorism 521.
1
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Method here does not signify the tool, with the aid of which scientific research
elaborates the thematically delimited domain of its objects. Method rather means
the manner in which any domain of objects to be researched has been delimited
in advance according to its objectivity. The method is the anticipatory blueprint
of the world [with a] thoroughgoing calculability of everything, susceptible to
experimentation and controllable by it. 3

Technological instrumentation remains the core of all such methods and enframing, the
challenging-forth of nature, is the result of the generation of thinkers who believed in
this manner of research. The method is not an open field of questioning and inquiry
because it already contains a blueprint for what it wants to find or accomplish
Analytic philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap did champion scientific thinking in
philosophy and yet had their own misgivings about traditional metaphysics.4
Metaphysics purports to say something meaningful by neither asserting any analytic
propositions nor falling within the domain of empirical science but fails because it
is compelled to employ words for which no criteria of application are specified and
which are therefore devoid of sense, or else to combine meaningful words in such a way
that neither an analytic (or contradictory) statement nor an empirical statement is
produced.

5

Any kind of talk outside the logic of language will inevitably lead to

Heidegger The Provenance of At and the Destination of Thinking p 122-3.
For the sake of brevity, I will limit my discussion to Carnap. For more discussion on the analytic
reaction to Heidegger cf Gilbert Ryle Heidegger s Sein und Zeit in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy:
Critical Essays, ed. Michael Murray (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 58 64; Mark A. Wrathall,
The Conditions of Truth in Heidegger and Davidson The Monist, Vol. 82, No. 2, Continental
Philosophy: For & Against (April 1999), pp. 304-323 and Charles Guignon Philosophy after
Wittgenstein and Heidegger Heidegger Reexamined Volume 4, eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall
(London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 227-250.
5 Rudolf Carnap
Overcoming Metaphysics in The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method, ed.
Richard M. Rorty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 30.
3
4
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senseless speculation that fails to say anything meaningful.6 Carnap adds The
(pseudo)statements of metaphysics do not serve for the description of states of affairs,
either existing ones (in that case they would be true statements) or nonexisting ones (in
that case they would be at least false statements). They serve for the expression of the
general attitude of a person toward life

7

His criticism is targeted towards traditional

metaphysics since Plato and also towards someone like Heidegger, who himself was
going against metaphysics Carnap would classify Heidegger s attempt to think more
primoridally than the explicit of apophantic logos as an excuse to delve into metaphysical
musings about language and the later writings about poetic thinking as a justification
for a way of life disguised as philosophy.8 Whether or not Carnap s criticism applies to
Heidegger, we confront the question: what does philosophizing mean? For Heidegger,
it is a way we find our place in the world and to have a bearing on our own existence.
For Carnap, and ironically also the metaphysicians that Carnap criticizes, it is a system
of correct description of the state of affairs whether it be realism idealism or logical

Cf Lee Braver comment logic eliminates meaningless words and pseudo-statements; positively, it
clarifies the proper use of concepts and sentences. Ignoring tautologies and contradictions, proper
language consists in empirically verifiable assertions about the world Analyzing Heidegger A History
of Analytic Reactions to Heidegger in Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays, ed. Daniel Dahlstrom
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011], p. 241).
7 Carnap
Overcoming Metaphysics p 32
8 Cf Carnap s remark
Here we confront personifications of natural phenomena which are the
quasipoetic expression of man's emotional relationship to his environment. The heritage of mythology is
bequeathed on the one hand to poetry, which produces and intensifies the effects of mythology on life in
a deliberate way; on the other hand, it is handed down to theology, which develops mythology into a
system we find that metaphysics also arises from the need to give expression to a man s attitude in life
(Ibid.).
6

Budha

45

positivism Carnap argues that the acceptance or rejection of

linguistic forms in any

branch of science, will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments

9

Heidegger s whole project is an attempt to overcome this way of instrumental
philosophy the method that wants to subjugate all thinking and speaking to a signsystem which can be constructed logically or technically, that is, to secure them as an
instrument of science

10

Even though I agree with Carnap that much of metaphysics

could be a justification for an attitude toward life rather than truth telling I disagree
that the primary task of philosophy is to construct a clear and distinct grid-like system
of scientific knowledge.11
Heidegger says All metaphysics including its opponent positivism speaks the
language of Plato. The basic word of its thinking, that is, of his presentation of the Being
of beings, is eidos, idea: the outward appearance in which beings as such show
themselves. Outward appearance, however, is a manner of presence

12

The outward

appearance that is in a manner of presence can be thought of in terms of the present-

Rudolf Carnap Empiricism Semantics and Ontology in The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical
Method, ed. Richard M. Rorty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 83.
10 Martin Heidegger
Phenomenology and Theology in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 56.
11 Cf Rorty s comment on Heidegger and the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey
When they discuss
the relation between philosophy and science, both men see Cartesian, Husserlian, and positivistic
attempts to make philosophy scientific as a disastrous abandonment of philosophy s proper function
Both see philosophy, at its best, as clearing away what impedes our delight, not as the discovery of a
correct representation of reality. Both men insist on the goal of philosophy as the reattainment of
innocence and the divestiture of the culture of our time Overcoming Heidegger and Dewey" in
Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978], p. 248).
12 Martin Heidegger
The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking in On Time and Being, trans. Joan
Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 67.
9
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at-hand abstraction of the object which anticipates the modern notions of objectivity
For Heidegger, Plato positions humans as detached observers who have a claim to
knowledge with the means of abstract unchanging forms.13 Heidegger says,
throughout the whole history of philosophy Plato s thinking remains decisive in
changing forms Metaphysics is Platonism

14

In this framework, all of reality and

phenomena in nature could be represented through theories and abstractions. Even
though he believes that theory can be useful, he thinks that it is limited and ultimately it
masks the more originary encounter with the world around us. 15 This sentiment is
reiterated by Levinas Metaphysical desire does not long for a return for it is the desire
of a land not of our birth for a land foreign to every nature

16

When the world becomes

a picture, we are removed from nature, a place of our essential dwelling. Heidegger s
turning away from metaphysics takes him back home to the question of human
dwelling.17 Technological thinking is always looking for the next big thing, the next
breakthrough, and rarely bothers to look back to where it started. Its self-certainty takes

Recall the first section in Chapter 1 where I briefly discussed the limitations of metaphysical distinction
between a detached ego and objects.
14 Martin Heidegger
The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking p 57
15 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World A Commentar on Heidegger s Being and Time: Division I
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 1-2 But Plato and our tradition got off on the wrong track by
thinking that one could have a theory of everything-even human beings and their world-and that the way
human beings relate to things is to have an implicit theory about them Heidegger is not against theory
He thinks it is powerful and important-but limited
16 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press,
1969), pp. 33-4.
17 I will discuss the Heidegger s notion of dwelling more thoroughly in Chapter 4.
13
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itself to new places and new objects of use. Both Levinas and Heidegger are aware of its
aim to take us away from our authentic dwelling in the world.
Another problem for Heidegger was the separation of essence and existence
the eternal realm of idea and the transient realm of becoming
thought

18

of

implicit in Plato's

The distinction between being, which is associated with permanence and

reality, and becoming, which is associated with transitoriness and a lesser kind of reality,
or namely representational reality is the product of the metaphysics heralded by
Plato. For Heidegger, this is not an adequate explanation of our being in the world and
it tries to put reality outside the world we encounter in the world of pure forms or
eidos. Reality turns into stable permanent unchanging presences and being and
essences are conceived in static present terms rather than in active terms

19

The

phenomenon of how those they can even come to presence is overlooked, if not
completely ignored as the being who gets thought of as the essent das Wesende]
becomes an object, either to be beheld . . . or to be acted upon. . . . The original worldmaking power physis degenerates into a prototype to be copied and imitated

20

How

the world emerges is not understood but only that the world is as represented in
objective forms.

Joan Stambaugh, Thoughts on Heidegger (Washington: University Press of America, 1991), pp. 10-1.
Gary Steiner, Animals and the Limits of Postmodernism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p.
52.
20 Ibid., p. 53.
18
19
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Heidegger says due to the manner in which it thinks of beings metaphysics

almost seems to be, without knowing it, the barrier that refuses human beings the
primordial relation of Being to the human essence

21

Thinking in terms of metaphysics

denies the acknowledgement of what is essential about human beings namely the
engaged lived experience of human Dasein. For Heidegger, the essence of being lies in
existence. But in metaphysics existence has its conceptual roots in existentia, which is
used interchangeably with actuality, reality, or presence, and he believed that
philosophers ever since Plato have not really escaped from this conception of being.22
Medieval philosophy conceives the latter as actualitas. Kant represents existentia as
actuality in the sense of the objectivity of experience. Hegel defines existentia as the selfknowing Idea of abso-lute subjectivity. Nietzsche grasps existentia as the eternal
recurrence of the same

23

All of these versions of the definition of existence force an

interpretation on phenomena in the world where the meaning of being human is
reduced to how we, as beings or entities, appear or show ourselves; they forget how
things emerge out of unconcealment into presence and as something available.
For Heidegger, metaphysics is concerned only with understanding beings, as they
show themselves, but not being the true essence of human existence Metaphysics says

Martin Heidegger Introduction to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 281.
22 Ibid, p. 283.
23 Martin Heidegger
Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 248.
21
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what beings are in bringing to a concept the beingness [ousia] of beings [entities]. In the
beingness of beings, metaphysics thinks being, yet without being able to ponder the
truth of being in the manner of its own thinking

24

Metaphysics determines what kind

of being the human is by pointing out the objective and timeless features of the human
subject.25 Here, it thinks existence or being through a predicative assignment of properties
to humans as well as other objects in the world. It can say, for example
but it cannot say

water boils

water exists because boiling is a property but existence it is not

as Kant had already observed in the Critique of Pure Reason that existence can be a
linguistic predicate but it is not a real predicate

26

Through the knowledge of

properties metaphysics can ultimately only point out the being-ness or entityness of beings or entities but not being, as existence, itself; it cannot explain Dasein s
comportment and the practical access to things in the world. Not just that, it obscures
the question of being by trying to order it and setting demands on how being should
manifest itself. Therefore Heidegger declares

Metaphysics does not ask about the

Martin Heidegger Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 232 (emphasis added).
25 Charles Kahn makes an interesting point that the idea of existing
the way it is used by Anslem and
by Descartes as in his I think therefore I am is not realized in the ontology of Plato and Aristotle For
the Greeks existence was determined by their concept of predicative truth X exists always meant X is
something Kahn says that it is naturally the theory of predication and not the concept of existence
that becomes the central and explicit theme of Aristotle s metaphysics as it was the implicit theme of
Plato s discussion of Being in the Sophist
Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in
Greek Philosophy in Essay on Being [New York: Oxford University Press, 2009], p. 73).
26 Taylor Carman
Foreword to Being and Time by Martin Heidegger, trans. John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2008), p. xiv.
24
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truth of being itself. Nor does it therefore ask in what way the essence of the human
being belongs to the truth of being. Metaphysics has not only failed up to now to ask
this question the question is inaccessible to metaphysics as such

27

Now if metaphysics fails to capture the essence of being, what is the alternative?
For Heidegger, it is a change in our conception of human existence: a move away from
viewing it as existentia, which is fixed and permanent towards viewing it as essentia,
which is open to the possibilities and change. He says to characterize with a single term
both the relation of Being to the essence of man and the essential relation of man to the
openness

there

Da

of Being Sein as such the name of Dasein

was chosen for the essential realm in which man stands as man

28

there-being]

Dasein, as briefly

discussed in Chapter 1, poses a challenge to the metaphysical abstraction of the world
as a detached subject and acknowledges the always already being-there of existence.
Dasein, the being there of the human, is a more originary relationship to the world, as a
unified phenomenology, than the metaphysics of the Platonic forms or the Cartesian
ego. It is a standing out into the open possibility of there and being where our
existence makes sense to us. Dasein is our understanding of existence, our making sense
of our own place in the world; the world is not separate from our own existence but is

Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 246. Heidegger also suggests that metaphysics also
fails to recognize the ontological difference between being and beings and puts them together and
conflates the two.
28 Heidegger
Introduction to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 283.
27
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always already accessible in a meaningful way. This phenomenon of standing-out in
existence is what Heidegger calls ek-sistence
Heidegger says ek-sistence, thought in terms of ecstasis, does not coincide with
existentia in either form or content. In terms of content, ek-sistence means standing out
into the truth of being and that the the ecstatic essence of the human being consists in
ek-sistence, which is different from the metaphysically conceived existentia

29

The root

of both the words ecstatic and ek-sistence originates from the Greek ekstasis
which literally means to stand out of oneself

Here Heidegger uses this way of

phrasing existence because he wants to connote the idea of standing or being in the
world by staying outside of the ego or the subjective self. To ek-sist is to be aware not
just of the self but also outside of the self, the world; it is always already being beyond
one s current situation by anticipating other possibilities in the future Because humans
can have this kind of consciousness, Heidegger thinks we have a unique relationship to
Being. Moreover, Heidegger warns against a potential misconstrual of this essence of
existence as a Platonic form that exists outside of the conscious world. He says,
The ecstatic essence of existence is therefore still understood inadequately as
long as one thinks of it as merely a standing out while interpreting the out
as meaning away from the interior of an immanence of consciousness or spirit
For in this manner existence would still be represented in terms of subjectivity
and substance while in fact the out ought to be understood in terms of the
outside itself of the openness of Being itself 30

29
30

Heidegger
Heidegger

Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, pp. 249, 248.
Introduction to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 283.
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In one sense the standing out can easily be thought of as standing objectively as a
detached subject looking out into the world of appearances. But this would be a
misguided understanding of ek-sisting, and this formulation of the essence of existence
would be nothing different than the one already dominant one, namely existentia.
Nevertheless, Heidegger thinks that it is possible to rework our predilection for
metaphysical thinking towards a freer and a more open understanding of essence,
which will grant us more intimacy to Dasein. Stambaugh quotes an example by
Heidegger

a desk can never touch a wall The desk might be physically smack up

against the wall but it can never touch that wall in the way a person can touch it

31

But

this does not mean that because a desk cannot touch the wall and cannot be aware of
itself being in the world it is not real and does not exist The desk exists as existentia,
with its extended properties, but it cannot exist as essentia, as a thing that can realize
and contemplate possible futures. Therefore, humans are the only entities that exist
essentially in the world.32 Here it is quite easy to see Heidegger s obsession for pointing
out the specialty of humans over the rest of the sentient world. However, he wants to
distinguish his position from humanism, the system of thought that places an important
value on human rationality and autonomy.

Stambaugh, Thoughts on Heidegger, p. 61.
Cf Heidegger s discussion of this issue in Introduction to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 283:
The proposition the human being alone exist does not at all mean that the human being alone is a real
being while all other beings are unreal and mere appearances or human representations
it means the
human being is that being whose Being is distinguished by an open standing that stands in the
unconcealedness of Being proceeding from Being in Being
31
32
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He says that every humanism after the first Roman humanism has presupposed

the most universal essence of the human being to be obvious that the human being is
the animal rationale

33

This is already a predicative interpretation of beings that has not

yet pondered the question of what it is to be essentially Humanism is either grounded
in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground of one

34

It is not concerned about

the truth of being but only about a certain kind of metaphysics of beings. It is certainly
grounded in metaphysical thinking and it would not be a surprise if it was itself a
ground of a metaphysics that aims to claim mastery over nature through superior
human rationality Heidegger says every humanism remains metaphysical In
defining the humanity of the human being, humanism not only does not ask about the
relation of being to the essence of the human being; be-cause of its metaphysical origin
humanism even impedes the question by neither recognizing nor understanding it

35

Just like the original critique of metaphysics, Heidegger lays the same kind of
accusation to humanism, that it is not concerned with our primordial encounter but
only with a secondary one.

2. From Calculative Thinking to Meditative Thinking

Heidegger thinks there is a natural extension of metaphysics that takes over our

Heidegger
Ibid.
35 Ibid.
33
34

Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 245.
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whole approach to scientific research called calculative thinking

Calculative

thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time
more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next.
Calculative thinking never stops never collects itself

36

This kind of thinking does not

just imply its use in machines or computers, but something more ominous

that it

overtakes our very way of interacting with the world. It thinks in computation of
entities and theorizes their properties and creates a reality of its own. As Nietzsche says,
Calculability exists precisely because things are unable to be other than they are

37

In

metaphysical thinking, things can appear only as calculable and determinable and are
unable to appear as they would if we let them.38
But calculative thinking, as discussed in the Chapter 2, is not neutral, and values
that are attached to this thinking is self-serving as it always moves towards efficiency
and mastery over the objects. This kind of thinking doesn't bother to wait and ask about
its own commitments and why it is underway; efficiency becomes an end in itself.
Heidegger says, calculation refuses to let anything appear except what is countable.
Everything is only whatever it counts

The calculative process of resolving beings into

Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and Hans Freund (New York: Harper
& Row, 1966), p. 46.
37 Nietzsche, The Will To Power, Aphorism 634.
38 However, this letting things appear should not be thought of as trying to grasp the in-itself [noumenal]
essences of things as Nietzsche says in his discussion of truth and falsity There is no essence-in-itself it
is only relations that constitute an essence
just as there can be no knowledge-in-itself The Will To
Power, Aphorism 625).
36
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what has been counted counts as the explanation of their being. Calculation uses all
beings in advance as that which is countable, and uses up what is counted for the
purpose of counting.

39

The only way beings manifest themselves is under the

categories of whether they are countable or not. This eventually becomes a reductionist
mode of dealing with existence and in doing so existence is interpreted in the same
vein. Perhaps it is a metaphysical cycle that explains nothing but itself and is
preoccupied with serving its own efficient ends, which Bacon and Descartes valorized.
Heidegger adds thanks to this calculability, the world becomes always and
everywhere subject to human dominance. Method signifies the victorious challenging
of the world for its thoroughgoing availability to humankind

40

The mastery of nature

and other beings is the hallmark of calculative thinking, which is inherently
technological in its essence.
Heidegger says calculative thinking compels itself into a compulsion to master
everything on the basis of the consequential correctness of its procedure

41

The two

ideas of mastery and truth as correctness form the centerpiece of this sort of
thinking. As discussed in Chapter 2, this impulse of mastery over things comes from a
long tradition in Western philosophy where the world is thought as being at our
disposal, ready to be manipulated. In the very conception of the world s existence

Heidegger
Heidegger
41 Heidegger
39
40

Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 235.
The Provenance of At and the Destination of Thinking p 123
Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 235.
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calculability and manipulability are revealed as presence or as actual, which gives rise to
the standing-reserve of nature in technological instrumentality. Mastery in thinking
suggests a possibility of an absolute representation of all reality in theory or axioms.
Reality, then, is nothing but a mechanism that can be encountered in calculations and
can be assessed in terms of correctness. The hope is that so far as the procedure of
experimentation and counting is correct, or corresponds to the already theorized system
of facts, the result can be quantified and truth about things could be encountered. But it
is so bound up on its own metaphysics for the sake of controlling nature that it fails to
point to any truth outside of itself, and simply ends up with more calculation and more
exactness.
Heidegger says exact thinking is never the most rigorous thinking if rigor
indeed receives its essence from the kind of rigorous effort whereby knowledge in each
case maintains itself within a relation to what is essential in beings. Exact thinking
merely binds itself to the calculation of beings and serves this end exclusively

42

If the

aim of knowledge is to inquire into essential relation between us and the world, exact
thinking becomes directionless. This kind of thinking is rigorous only insofar as rigor is
assessed in terms of correspondence to the axioms and that it is counts; anything else,
exactness loses its relevance. With this Heidegger wants to point towards what he
believes to be a more promising kind of thinking, one whose rigor has nothing to do

42

Heidegger

Postscript to What is Metaphysics

in Pathmarks, p. 235.
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with counting or metaphysical abstractness. The rigor of this other kind of thinking
does not consist merely in an artificial that is technical-theoretical exactness of
concepts. It lies in the fact that saying remains purely in the element of the truth of
being and lets the simplicity of its manifold dimensions rule

43

This thinking is a

participation in truth-telling of Dasein and our relationship to it, and not a theorizing of
objective and timeless concepts Heidegger uses the terms essential thinking and
meditative thinking to convey this formulation of thinking that seeks to amend the
legacy of metaphysical thinking.
In his Letter on Humanism Heidegger recounts a story of the Pre-Socratic
thinker Heraclitus, who once gets visited by foreigners who are curious about how he is
living as a thinker

The foreigners who wish to visit the thinker expect to catch sight of

him perchance at that very moment when, sunk in profound meditation, he is
thinking

Instead of this the sightseers find Heraclitus by a stove

44

Obviously, they

were disappointed at the sight of the great thinker doing a mundane task of lighting a
fire like anybody else. What they did not realize that is that the practical life of the
thinker and his comportment in his dwelling gives meaning to his existence. Heraclitus
is engaging in understanding of his place by lighting a fire in order to anticipate a near
future that gives warmth to his dwelling. He did not make his way of being explicit

43
44

Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 241.
Ibid., p. 270.
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through apophantic assertion to the sightseers. A kind of meditation that does not feel
the need to express itself explicitly is anticipated by Heidegger s early work Being and
Time and is realized more fully in his later writings such as the Letter on Humanism
and Discourse on Thinking

Whenever one thinks of meditation, one expects that it

constitutes inactivity, that it may be palliative but is nevertheless, a state of doing
nothing But thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it
or because it is applied says Heidegger

thinking acts insofar as it thinks

45

It is not a

phenomenon that is separate from the rest of the world. So long as we are thinking and
questioning concerning our relationship to the world and our Dasein, we are already
acting, being in the world in a certain way. He says, thinking is l engagement par l Etre
pour l Etre engagement by being for being

and this can be accomplished only if we

can free ourselves from a technical interpretation of thinking as in the case of
metaphysics.46 Even the distinction of the two modes of theoria and praxis in thinking is
already within a technical interpretation
Heidegger adds This meditative thinking is what we have in mind when we
say that contemporary man is in flight-from-thinking. Yet you may protest: mere
meditative thinking finds itself floating unaware above reality. It loses touch. It is

45
46

Heidegger
Ibid.

Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 239.
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worthless for dealing with current business

47

It is probably true that meditative

thinking has no practical value, if that value depends on the immediacy of tangible use.
This is where calculative thinking has no problems showing its results as every major
technological breakthrough has been made in the realm of calculation. But this
mysterious meditative thinking seems like it has nothing else to offer. This is because
either this thinking is complete nonsense, an artificial concoction by an ascetic, or this
thinking is quite difficult and has not been attempted often enough in philosophy.
Aristotle s idea of the contemplative life is helpful in informing what Heidegger means
by meditation. Aristotle thought that contemplation (the ria) satisfies the essential
criteria for happiness (eudaimonia) done for the sake of itself. He says that unlike the
virtues of pleasures and justice, contemplation is the only activity which alone would
seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the
contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the
action.

48

Contemplation does not demand any action but it is not the same a passive

Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 46; also see his remark: Because man is a thinking, that is, a
meditating being. Thus meditative thinking need by no means be high-flown. It is enough if we dwell on
what lies close and meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and
now here on this patch of home ground now in the present hour of history p 47
48 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Book X,
1177b, p. 194. However, it is to be noted that Aristotle s theoria was the contemplation of unchanging and
necessary truths, which is something that Heidegger would characterize as metaphysical thinking. But
this characterization of Aristotle is not entirely tenable because Aristotle himself has a more varied notion
of what contemplation means especially in Book VI Intellectual Virtue where he distinguishes
contemplating of variable and invariable things as well as scientific and calculative knowledge
(Ibid., 1139a, p. 103).
47
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imagination or wishful thinking. It is an exercise of the intellect but not for any specific
purpose. Heidegger, as the proponent of this kind of thinking, obviously claims the
latter as he says, at times it requires a greater effort. It demands more practice. It is in
need of even more delicate care than any other genuine craft. But it must also be able to
bide its time to await as does the farmer whether the seed will come up and ripen

49

One requires waiting, patience, and diligence on their part to even attempt this sort of
thinking, but given that the world of calculation is so much efficient and faster, it is easy
to brush it off out of inconvenience. Yet, this does not mean that such a thinking cannot
be attempted.
Heidegger says Such thinking responds to the claim of being through the
human being letting historical essence be responsible to the simplicity of a singular
necessity, one that does not necessitate by way of compulsion, but creates the need that
fulfills itself in the freedom of sacrifice

50

It does not impose any preconceived structure

on its path towards thinking but situates itself within an open of possibilities of
meaning; it is a thinking that sets beings free, responds to being, without wanting to
force an interpretation.51 But this notion of freedom is not mere absence of constraint
with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor is it on the other hand mere readiness for

Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, pp. 46-7.
Heidegger Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 236.
51 Ibid p 237
The thinking of being seeks no hold in beings Essential thinking heeds the measured
signs of the incalculable and recognizes in the latter the un-foreseeable arrival of the unavoidable
49
50
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what is required and necessary and so somehow a being

52

It is not a faculty

possessed by humans but is a ground for the possibility of unconcealment, of
encountering truth as in its fundamental form as well as in correctness Freedom for
what is opened up in an open region lets beings be the beings they are. Freedom now
reveals itself as letting beings be

53

Truth as correctness does not allow this sort of

freedom to pervade as it forces a pre-given interpretation on things. In modernity, this
imposition took the form of subject-object representation of the world. But for
Heidegger, we are beings that are able participate in the freedom of letting things be
and can situate ourselves in the thrownness of the past and the projection towards the
future. Only insofar as we take heed of this open region of freedom can we be more
attuned to be authentically. The thinking of contemplation dwells on this region.
We err in our thinking if we forget this realm of freedom and unconcealment.
Errancy is the essential counteressence to the originary essence of truth Errancy opens
itself up as the open region for every counterplay to essential truth. Errancy is the open
site for and ground of error. Error is not merely an isolated mistake but the kingdom
(the dominion) of the history of those entanglements in which all kinds of erring get
interwoven

54

Thinking must not forget that beings are first concealed and if essential

Heidegger On the Essence of Truth in Pathmarks, p. 145.
Ibid., p. 144. I will talk more about this in Chapter 4.
54 Ibid., p. 150. This is a hint that we cannot assure ourselves that we can establish a complete control over
being and truth. The confidence in this assurance is why traditional metaphysics is mistaken.
52
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truth is the letting be of unhiddenness, the essential error is the letting be of hiddenness.
The erring that is commonly conceived as the incorrectness of judgments and falsity of
knowledge, is only one mode of erring and moreover the most superficial one

55

Erring leads us astray into a muddling of our place in the world and leads to a
forgetting of being, because of which we usually find refuge in the thinking of clear and
distinct ideas of metaphysics. But thinking in an originary manner listens to the voice of
being and obedient to the voice of being seeks from being the word through which
the truth of being comes to language

56

Thinking in this way grants a path for truth to

come to language. Heidegger makes an interesting statement

All refutation in the field

of essential thinking is foolish Strife among thinkers is the lovers quarrel concerning
the matter itself. It assists them mutually toward a sim-ple belonging to the Same, from
which they find what is fitting for them in the destiny of being

57

Any kind of thinking that attends to the word of being and lets the truth unfold
will not find a difference in what it encounters. The encounter of unconcealment of one
essential thinker is necessarily the same as that of the other; thinking before calculation
thinks the same. This notion in Heidegger is inspired by Heraclitus, who said (in
Fragment DK 50

Listening not to me but to the logos [the Saying], it is wise [to

Ibid., p. 151.
Heidegger Postscript to What is Metaphysics p 237
57 Heidegger
Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 256.
55
56
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sophon] to agree [homo-logein] that all things are one [hen panta einai

58

In saying

listening not to me but to the logos, Heraclitus denounces his subjectivity and
attempts to listen to the more primordial phenomena happening around him and thinks
of what appears before him as the one and the same. In his essential thinking, he
overcomes confusion that arises in the explicit form of logos [apophansis]. Charles Kahn
says The reference to a logos somehow independent of Heraclitus will be immediately
clear if he has just spoken of the deep logos of the soul The thought will be listen not
to me but to the discourse within your soul and it will tell you all

59

This deep logos is

anticipated by Heidegger s hermeneutic logos, which engages in disclosing meanings in
practical contexts But Kahn s understanding of logos is not quite the same as that of
Heidegger; nevertheless, both speak of a pervasiveness of disclosure that is neither
confined within an ego-subject nor disassociated into a universal objectivity. Also, there
is a unity, an agreement (homologein) in the thinkers when they heed this deeper logos.
Heraclitus also says An unapparent aphan s] connection [harmonia] is stronger
[kreitt n] than an apparent [phaneros one

60

This suggests that the hidden connection

with the world is much stronger than any connection that is made explicit thereafter.

Patricia Curd (ed.), A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., 2011), p. 42.
59 Charles Kahn, Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 130; also
cf. my discussion of discourse and logos in Chapter 1.
60 Curd, A Presocratics Reader, p. 45; Kahn translates it as The hidden attunement [harmonia] is better than
the obvious one Kahn, Art and Thought of Heraclitus, p. 65).
58
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Once we make a harmony apparent, harmony becomes weaker. 61 Our hermeneutic
involvement in the world becomes weaker and becomes something other than itself in
the mode of assertion. Essential thinking, whether or not it is actually possible to
accomplish, is this attempt to ponder these unapparent connections and allow for a
venturing into the unknown hiddenness of existence. It is the attempt to be at home in
the world.62

This particular way of formulation was suggested by Prof Jeffrey Turner also cf Kahn s commentary
And it is no accident that the same title may describe his mode of expression where the immediate
surface meaning is often less significant than the latent intention carried by allusion enigma and
resonance Kahn Art and Thought of Heraclitus, p. 203).
62 Eva Brann in her Logos of Heraclitus (Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books Inc., 2011) appropriately quotes
Charles Baudelaire Nature is a temple whose living pillars Sometimes allow confused words to
emerge Man passes there through forests of symbols Which observe him with familiar looks p 134
61

Chapter 4: Dwelling and the Path to Poetic Thinking

1. Thinking in the Destitute Time

Essential thinking becomes absolutely crucial in finding our place in the world.
But have we found our place, our dwelling? Have we become alienated? Heidegger
poses these two questions What is the state of dwelling in our precarious age
and what are poets for in a destitute time

1

and

Before these questions can be dealt with,

we must first understand what this destitute or precarious time is What emerges
as the primary object of this destitution is the homelessness of human beings the lack
of a dwelling, and the fleeing of gods, all of which are intimately related.
Homelessness so understood consists in the abandonment of beings by being.
Homelessness is the symptom of the oblivion of being. Because of it the truth of being
remains unthought

2

This homelessness is the consequence of our detachment from

our understanding of our own essence, the way we are in the world. Our destitution is a
product of hiddenness of essences and meanings and concealment of truth as well as

Martin Heidegger What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New
York Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2013 p 89 Building Dwelling Thinking in Poetry, Language,
Thought, p. 158.
2 Martin Heidegger
Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 258. This is reminiscent of the Early German
Romantic poet Novalis who said Philosophy is really homesickness the desire to be everywhere at home
(in Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon, translated and edited by David W.
Wood [Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007] entry 857, p. 155).
1
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the path towards it. It occurs when our calculated ordering of nature gives rise to the
illusion about the prosperity and the abundance of our time. When metaphysical
thinking becomes too enamored with itself, it loses the trace of the essential path. It
becomes destitute by losing the path that leads away from this destitution. When the
destitute time is no longer able even to experience its own destitution then appears
the time s absolutely destitute character

3

This destitution of homelessness is the

forgetting of Being by human beings.
Heidegger says that the human being is the being whose being as ek-sistence
consists in his dwelling in the nearness of being. The human being is the neighbor of
being

4

As noted previously Heidegger uses ek- to talk about the thrownness of our

existence into the world. We do not simply exist as objects in the world. Heidegger
thinks that our existence is a thrown existence; we are hurled into existence without our
say in the matter

What throws in such projection is not the human being but being

itself, which sends the human being into the ek-sistence of Da-sein that is his essence

5

Thrownness means that we exist historically and have a surplus of meaningful
connectedness to our past. But in our thrownness, we are not chained to the past; we are
also projected towards the future. This projection is the condition for the possibility of
actualizing what we seek to actualize. Understanding, our sense-making activity of

Heidegger What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 91.
Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 261.
5 Ibid., p. 257.
3
4
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Being, is what projects us to this future, to the possibility of revealing the meaning of
our being

Understanding is thought at the same time from out of the unconcealedness

of Being. Understanding is ecstatic, thrown projection, where ecstatic means: standing
in the realm of the open

6

We exist essentially in this thrownness of the past and the

open projection to the future. We are faced with making choices and willing. We are
faced with the predicament of actualizing multiple possibilities.
Moreover Heidegger says this destiny of thrown projection] propriates as the
clearing of being

which it is The clearing grants nearness to being

7

The clearing is the

realm of freedom that lets human beings participate in a more fundamental
encountering of the world. We are free to the possibility of being in touch with our own
essence. As long as there is no such clearing, we cannot recognize or even begin to
encounter the essence of existence our Dasein Thus the clearing of being is to be
understood in terms of this thrown projection ; it is the open space of meaning.
World is the clearing of being into which the human being stands out on the basis of
his thrown essence

8

The world is always primarily the basis of our existence. Our

thrownness cannot be anywhere but in the world as manifested openness. It is the
ground in which beings like us occur and emerge in time. This is why Heidegger thinks

Martin Heidegger Introduction to What is Metaphysics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 286.
7 Heidegger
Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 257.
8 Ibid., p. 266.
6

in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill
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that human Dasein has a unique relationship with existence. One aspect of the
uniqueness of humans that is denied to entities such as animals and plants is the
nearness to the truth of existence as Heidegger says man s being open is a being held
toward

whereas the animal s being open is a being taken by

absorbed in its encircling ring

9

and thereby a being

Humans have the freedom to exist in the openness and

thus make sense of their existence in this freedom. Animals are essentially unfree in that
they are within the open realm that remains before the human. This leads Heidegger to
say that humans are world-forming and animals are world-poor

10

But this does not lead to the conclusion that the human being is the lord of
beings instead the human being is the shepherd of being

11

Human beings as entities

in the world do not have precedence over other entities. Being, as an essential clearing,
is not one of the faculties that is at our disposal and is not something that we have
mastery over At best we are shepherds of Being we are the caretakers of Being We
respond to Being with a responsibility to preserve our essential relation to it. The
lordship of nature is a residue of the metaphysical thinking that has dominated our
present discourse whereas the thinking that thinks from the question concerning the
truth of being questions more primordially than metaphysics can. Only from the truth

Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, p. 343.
Ibid., p. 177.
11 Heidegger
Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 260.
9
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of being can the essence of the holy be thought

12

Only this kind of thinking can think

more primordially and rigorously than the thinking of metaphysics. When Heidegger
talks about the holy, it is not clear if he is suggesting it as religious practice.
Nonetheless, there is a religious dimension to the idea of the holy in Heidegger, as it is
thought of as a place of ritual practice, our comportment towards a way of being in the
world Insofar as thinking limits itself to its task it directs the human being at the
present moment of the world's destiny into the primordial dimension of his historical
abode

13

Thinking about the truth of our being directs our attention to the manner in

which we inhabit the earth, our dwelling, our historical abode

But what is this

dwelling?
Heidegger says that dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth
This idea of dwelling is quite contrary to how we conventionally understand dwelling,
which is a mere occupying of a lodging

15

Heidegger thinks of dwelling as a place of

freedom as he says that to dwell to be set at peace means to remain at peace within
the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. The
fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving.

16

In this formulation,

dwelling sets at peace this open region of freedom for beings to be close to their Being,

Ibid., p. 267.
Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 267.
14 Heidegger
Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 146.
15 Heidegger
Poetically Man Dwells
Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 213.
16 Heidegger
Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 147.
12
13
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as freedom here is revealed as letting beings be

17

Letting beings be is not to be

understood in a negative sense of letting alone, of renouncing it, of indifference and
even neglect

it is the heeding and preserving of Being 18 Thus letting be is a being

at home with our own existence and taking care of the home, the dwelling place. It is
what saves us from the danger of losing ourselves, of being homeless, of losing our
relationship to Being Heidegger quotes Hölderlin
saving power also

19

But where danger is, grows / The

In this danger of losing ourselves and our bearing in the world, if

we are able to recognize where we have erred and what is wrong with our condition, we
are also able to save ourselves from the very danger But this saving does not only
snatch something from a danger. To save really means to set something free into its
own presencing

20

Just as dwelling lets beings be, human beings must also let dwelling,

the earth, be; human beings must save the earth. But by saving the earth, the mortal
does not master the earth and does not subjugate it but becomes a caretaker a
shepherd of the Being of beings.21 In saving the earth, we mortals do not become
saviors because a savior traditionally understood as a detached being intervening on the
matter at hand; but for Heidegger, it is rather to be understood as an engaged being

Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 248.
Martin Heidegger On the Essence of Truth in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 144.
19 Heidegger
The Question Concerning Technology p 34
20 Heidegger
Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought p 148 Letter on Humanism
Pathmarks, p. 252.
21 Heidegger
Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 146.
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who has just as much of a stake on nature as nature itself.
Heidegger recalls the saying of Heraclitus Fragment 119 which goes
anthropoi daimon, usually translated as A man s character is his daimon

22

ethos
Ethics

which is rooted in the Greek word ethos bears the weight of the meaning of the word
abode

An ethical life is a dwelling in the nearness of divinity of daimon. Heidegger

further interprets this saying

The familiar abode for humans is the open region for

the presencing of god (the unfamiliar one

23

This suggests that only by dwelling can

we exist in the openness to the unfamiliar realm of the holy, which demands our ethical
attention and care. Only by being situated in the familiar realm of our dwelling can we
then venture towards the unfamiliar realm of the holy. Our destitution occurs when our
dwelling our ethos itself becomes unfamiliar to us To dwell means to be in the
presence of the holy. However, the kind of thinking that truly ponders the truth of our
being and so defines the human being s essential abode is set out neither by ethics nor
by ontology.24 If philosophy is to overcome its grounding in metaphysics, it has to think
more rigorously, as discussed in Chapter 3, and ponder our essential way of being in
the world. It cannot simply satisfy itself with the truths created by apophantic logos. It
has to dwell on our more originary relationship with the world through hermeneutic
logos. This thinking has to care about the ethical bond in the time of technological

Heidegger Letter on Humanism
Ibid., p. 271.
24 Ibid., p. 271.
22
23

Pathmarks, p. 269.
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human beings

25

Our ethical bonds become even more important, become more

threatened, once there is a calculated ordering by a metaphysical thinking that creates a
separation between us and other entities, nature, and Being itself. A calculated
gathering is not a poetic gathering fostered by art and safeguarded by our dwelling. We
might be able to live in technology but not dwell in it.
We measure deeds of scientific knowledge and its research projects by the
impressive and successful achievements of praxis

26

But the deed of thinking is

neither theoretical nor practical nor is it the conjunction of these two forms of
comportment

and yet it is a deed a deed that surpasses all praxis

thinking

permeates action and production, not through the grandeur of its achievement and not
as a consequence of its effect, but through the humbleness of its inconsequential
accom plishment

27

The thinking that Heidegger wants us to participate in is not

subservient to practical use For Heidegger

questioning is the piety of thought

28

Thinking, as discussed in Chapter 3, is the same as questioning; it is an opening up of a
horizon of possibilities in order to recognize our ends and well as being in tune with
our origins. It attends to the clearing of being, the thrown projection of our existence.
Hans Jonas gave an interesting insight into this matter He says that in Aristotle s

Ibid., p. 268.
Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 257.
27 Ibid., p. 274.
28 Heidegger
The Question Concerning Technology p 35
25
26
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thinking
eternal

speculative theoretical sciences were concerned with unchangeable and
first causes and intelligible forms of being without an action of their own and

the practical sciences were concerned with experiential knowledge by the planned
changing of the changeable

29

The practical sciences are valuable because they are

engaged in producing results that are applicable, whereas the theoretical sciences were
done for their own sake But as Descartes gave birth to a theory with inherently
technological potential

it resulted in a fusion of theory and practice

30

Theory

became transformed to serve the function of knowledge and praxis. It was no longer an
activity done for its own sake. It was no longer a deed but became a means for all deeds;
theory became an instrument.
Now, one asks the question: what is the use for this new kind of theory that has
technological potential

Jonas says The ultimate end of all use is the same as the end

of all activity, and this is twofold: preservation of life, and betterment of life that is,
promotion of the good life

31

As I had mentioned in Chapter 2, as far as the

preservation of life is concerned, this new scientific theory has proven extremely useful
with the modern technology of medicine, health services, and increase in the overall
longevity of human life. It has also given rise to new technologies in architecture that

Hans Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biological, p.
189.
30 Ibid., p. 190.
31 Ibid., p. 191.
29
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can sufficiently cope with the effects of earthquakes and tsunamis. The list of the
achievements of this scientific theory is inexhaustible and there is no denying the
inherent goodness of these acts. However, only inquiring about how the preservation of
life can be accomplished and how catastrophes can be averted might make us feel
excused from inquiring into ends

32

It would be ridiculous to think about how to save

for a retirement plan when one is inside a burning house. Obviously, averting
catastrophe is an urgent matter and there is nothing more competent than technological
science to resolve these issues of emergencies But Jonas says the anticipation of
success inherent in all struggle against danger, misery, and injustice must face the
question of what life befits man when the emergency virtues of courage, charity, and
justice have done their work

33

For Heidegger thinking of a new kind that is neither

practical or theoretical has this responsibility to inquire into the truth of our existence
our ultimate end. Thinking of this kind is a deed that denies this metaphysical
distinction of theory and practice. It not only thinks about the ends but also the origins;
thinking about the end of being is ultimately thinking about the origin. In the
conventional use of the word origin

there is no suggestion towards ends and has a

connotation of being more primitive than ends temporally, as well as in terms of
sophistication. But for Heidegger, the question about ends is intimately bound up with

32
33

Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory p 208
Ibid., p. 208.
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the question about origins. Thinking of this sort is circular in that it ends up where it
begins something that is echoes in the Heraclitus Fragment 79 B103

The beginning

and the end are common in the circumference of a circle and Parmenides Fragment 5
for me it is indifferent from where I am to begin: for that is where I will arrive back
again

But the destitution of our time is such that what must already be familiar to

us, our origin, remains concealed. As long as we cannot situate ourselves in our origins,
we cannot think about our ultimate ends. As long as we cannot dwell, we cannot
encounter the holy. Origin is what takes us back to our being, which something that
modern thought has forgotten.
However, in pursuing our origin and philosophizing about the primordial
human essence isn t Heidegger committing an error that Nietzsche dreaded in his
Genealogy of the Morals? That was the error that permeated philosophy since Plato to
Hegel that in its pursuit of the origin Ursprung

it aimed to capture the exact

essence of things their purest possibilities and their carefully protected identities

34

The origin was thought of as a pure, untarnished essence that can somehow be captured
through methods that are also pure, transcendent, or absolute. Someone like Kant did
not simply venture to pinpoint the exact essence of reason but also the essence of
morality, the practical sphere of human life. Whenever someone speaks of human

Michel Foucault Nietzsche Genealogy History in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rainbow (New York:
Pantheon, 1984), p. 78.
34
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nature as so and so or talks about the nature or essence of things, one is attempting to
point at an immobile time or space that precedes all events. Foucault says that the
fixation on origins is a metaphysical extension which arises from the belief that things
are most precious and essential at the moment of birth.

35

But when dealing with

Heidegger s approach one should not think of origin as these independent entities
that precede all contingencies; the origin is grounded in the temporality as an
admixture of countless meanings surrounding it Therefore Heidegger s pursuit of
origins is the kind of pursuit that Nietzsche, in fact, thinks is the task of the thinker,
which is to trace the origin as genealogy (Herkunft) and not as Ursprung. Foucault says,
an examination of descent Herkunft) also permits the discovery, under the unique
aspect of a trait or a concept, of the myriad events through which they were formed.
Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that
operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things

36

The approach of the genealogist

is very much attentive to the historical details that a traditional metaphysical historian
might count as insignificant, and addresses the chains that were broken, replaced,
abused, trampled with, or valorized. The genealogist carefully traces the Heraclitean
circle but does not attempt to skip it or completely abandon it thus dispel s the
chimeras of the origin

37

Heidegger, arguably, is such a genealogist in his endeavor to

Foucault Nietzsche Genealogy History p 79
Ibid., p. 81.
37 Ibid., p. 80.
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find the path to this historical dwelling of human beings. Heidegger is not looking for a
romantic revival of the origins of our questioning of being, but is working towards
unfolding the historical traces that distorted the meaning of Being in order to rethink
being by a deeper understanding of its genealogy.

2. On the Nature of Poetic Dwelling

Full of merit yet poetically man dwells on this earth

38

So is the saying by

Hölderlin that Heidegger wants to interrogate. This attempt to be in conversation with
Hölderlin is not a mere philosophizing through poetry, if philosophizing entails
bringing the revealing of poetry into concepts as he says There would then be no
moment in which to make a contrived myth out of the figure of the poet. There would
then be no occasion to misuse his poetry as a rich source for a philosophy

39

Instead, if

philosophy thinks, it must think poetically. It must not be enchanted by poetry but
instead learn to think soberly into what poetry says and learn to hear what was
previously unspoken.40 Yet what is the essence of poetry?
Ever since Socrates in Plato s Republic declared poetry as neither containing
knowledge nor the mastery of truth the philosophical understanding of poetry has
not entirely lost this connotation. Poets have more of an accidental relationship to truth

Heidegger
Heidegger
40 Ibid.
38
39

Poetically Man Dwells
Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 214.
What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 93.
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than an essential relation

Poetry is either rejected as a frivolous mooning and

vaporizing into the unknown, and a flight into dreamland, or is counted as a part of
literature

poetry cannot appear otherwise than as literature

41

Whereas Plato s

Socrates thought poetry was an unsatisfactory imitation of the world, Aristotle was more
sympathetic as he thought that poetry, as independent outside of philosophy, is
worthwhile insofar as it corresponds to the philosopher s real conception of the
world. Nonetheless, both thought that philosophy with its metaphysics and concepts
had a more original relationship to the truth than the poets. The poets poetized
vicariously yet inadequately through philosophy s true concept of the world But for
Heidegger, poetry is not a mere musing or imagination. Nor is its value to be assessed
in terms of how much it corresponds to the real world defined by metaphysical
concepts. Furthermore, poetic thinking is not an ornamentation that fulfills the
limited worldview of metaphysical thinking; its nature and disposition are
fundamentally different. No matter how sophisticated our techn [craft and knowledge]
and our art is it does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and
hover over it. Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it,
and thus brings him into dwelling

42

Poetry is an undertaking in humility. It is waiting,

listening, and pondering by being situated in an earthly existence.

41
42

Heidegger
Poetically Man Dwells
Ibid., p. 216.

Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 211-2.
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In the phrase poetically man dwells Heidegger says that poetry first causes

dwelling to be dwelling Poetry is what really lets us dwell

43

In dealing with beings,

poetry lets beings be and preserves and pays heed to the nature of beings 44 The
creation of poetry is a kind of building of a saving place that preserves the essence of
human existence.45 It is an act of freedom, a letting of language to hold sway over the
poet, so the poet can utter the holy. It is a standing in the clearing of being where the
poet is able access the depths of their human their mortal essence

The more poetic a

poet is the freer (that is, the more open and ready for the unforeseen) his saying

the

greater is the purity with which he submits what he says to an ever more painstaking
listening

46

The poets cannot indulge with themselves; they have to dwell on the

clearing of being and their thrownness in language

The thinking of being protects the

word, and in such protectiveness fulfills its vocation. It is a care for our use of language.
The thinker says being The poet names the holy

47

Poetizing is a care for the use of

language and it is an act of proclaiming what is sacred about the word It is a respect
for the proclaimed and a thanking that looks outwards by projecting itself out from the
mere subjectivity of the poet. The poet does not proclaim the holy in order to subjugate
and gain mastery of the holy the way a colonizer declares dominance over a land by

Ibid., p. 213.
See my discussion about letting beings be in Chapter 3.
45 Heidegger
Poetically Man Dwells
Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 213.
46 Ibid., p. 214.
47 Heidegger
Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 237.
43
44
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naming it. The poets nurse and nurture in the essential realm of holy; they listen. Thus,
in poetizing, the poet names the holy.48 But isn t this poet just a secular version of the
religious prophet who claims to have heard the holy word of God, or of divinity? Is the
poet a secular prophet? This is more likely than not, because Heidegger himself had a
religious upbringing and had also demanded a religious funeral. Perhaps we can use
the word prophet interchangeably with poet as long as the notion of prophet does
not involve any sort of commanding or ordering.
This naming does not consist merely in something already known being
supplied with a name; it is rather that when the poet speaks the essential word, the
existent is by this naming nominated as what it is. So, it becomes known as existent

49

The poet does not name what was already present but in naming it, it presences into
existence. The poetic creation has an intimate relationship to the void, a non-place, a
non-existence. It is not a representation of what was already there but an act of creating
meaning out of non-meaning. It is a venturing into the unfamiliar daimon that is not
yet present in poetic language. But in this venturing in language also lies the danger
and Heidegger says it is language which first creates the manifest conditions for

A similar idea of poetry was also pronounced by Percy Bysshe Shelly Poets are the hierophants of an
unapprehended inspiration, the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present,
the words which express what they understand not Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the World
(in The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Vol. III, Harry Buxton Forman (ed.) [London: Reeves and
Turner, 1880], p. 144, emphasis added).
49 Martin Heidegger
Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry in Existence and Being, (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 1949), p. 304.
48
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menace and confusion to existence, and thus the possibility of the loss of existence, that
is to say

danger

50

As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the danger is also

where there lies the saving power; we cannot be saved if the thinkers and the poets are
complacent and do not dare to venture into danger, into the confusion of existence, with
rigor and care.
Language is the condition for the art of poetry that lets things reveal themselves.
So long as the language of poetry deals with the apophantic as of assertion rather than
the hermeneutic as of understanding there are bound to be confusions about existence
and our place in the world, thus bringing the danger close to us. Language is not simply
a stock of words and syntactical rules but a conversation where beings speak and
hear from one another.51 If the question being is pondered only propositionally, the real
essence of Dasein remains in the dark. But Heidegger thinks that in the hermeneutic way
of relating to the world, there is no confusion or repudiation; as he said that the conflict
between essential thinkers is the

lovers quarrel

52

A conversation between thinkers

will always be a conversation of the same thing, if such conversation is possible.
Hölderlin s poetic text which ends with the phrase on this earth is not
superfluous because our dwelling already means man s stay on earth

on this

Heidegger Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry p 298
Ibid., p. 301.
52 Heidegger
Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 256. I discuss this at the end of Chapter 3 in relation to
Heraclitus fragments.
50
51
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earth and not anywhere else 53 Being on the earth does not simply mean material
existence. It is not simply a totality of substances and mechanisms. Earth is our
primordial grounding and a place where beings like us emerge. Having an earthly
existence does not simply mean existing as a mere substantia or extension (a material
entity with extended properties) as in Cartesian metaphysics. It is existing within the
surplus of meanings and entities, and being close to our dwelling, a place that preserves
and protects us. But one could ask: if the earth is truly our dwelling that preserves and
protects, why are there hurricanes, droughts, and other natural disasters that ruthlessly
take the lives of countless beings every day? The same version of this question comes
up in the religious dilemma of the benevolent God. The answer to this question has
serious repercussions for Heidegger s thinking and is a challenge to Heidegger s
criticism of metaphysics. It becomes quite a relevant question: how can nature be
anything other than a mechanism? Just as God is no longer relevant in the present
humanism, neither God nor nature is sacred or holy.54 By declaring nature to be a sacred
ground of dwelling, is Heidegger artificially creating a version of nature that is contrary
its true version which is a neutral valueless mechanism Aren t we the ones who
bring values to the valueless nature perhaps because of our proclivity to create
values where there are none? What about someone like the popularizer of scientific

Heidegger
Poetically Man Dwells
Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 215.
Cf Heidegger s discussion in The Word of Nietzsche God Is Dead in Question Concerning
Technology and Other Essays, pp. 53-112.
53
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thinking Carl Sagan who championed space exploration with a conviction that We
began as wanderers and we are wanderers still

55

What about Nietzsche s observation

in Human, All Too Human that He who has attained to only some degree of freedom of
mind cannot feel other than a wanderer on the earth

though not as a traveler to a final

destination: for this destination does not exist. But he will watch and observe and keep
his eyes open to see what is really going on in the world; for this reason he may not let
his heart adhere too firmly to any individual thing; within him too there must be
something wander ing that takes pleasure in change and transience

56

We now know

through science that in a few billion years Earth is going to be swallowed up by our
expanding sun and every life on earth will evaporate. And eventually everything that
ever was will be gone with a bang or a whimper. What are we to make of such
knowledge? Sagan believes that this gives us a reason to say that we are wanderers
because eventually we have to leave the earth to survive. But this also equally gives us a
reason to believe that we are dwellers, settlers, because if we need to wander to survive,
we need to settle to be

to rest and contemplate our own existence. Heidegger might

respond to this by saying that Dasein is ultimately situated in time and completely
detached from the objective knowledge of the universe offered by science. But is this
not a myopic thinking of Heidegger that cannot inquire beyond lived experience?

Carl Sagan, Cosmos (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 193.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005) § 638, p. 203.
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Maybe. But insofar as we experience the earth phenomenologically, we will never
experience it in a timeless objective realm. No matter what its fate is in objective time,
we will only be acquainted with it within our horizon in time and place.
Heidegger s notion of Nature that echoes the meaning of the Greek word
physis

that which arises

is a more adequate way of understanding his talk about

the earth.57 The earth as Nature is life

a place where beings emerge and not simply a

ball of rock floating around the sun Heidegger says that Nature means the Being of
beings and a will that gathers every ens entity into itself

58

It is where things come

together and entities come to life. Nature as Being lets beings loose into the daring
venture

Being is the venture pure and simple It ventures us us humans It ventures

the living beings

59

It is this essential ground of Being that has the originary source of

the meaning of existence; it is a ground for a poetic creation. It is no surprise so many of
the poets seem to turn to nature in order to be ventured by it, and thus inspire the
revealing of poetry. Heidegger says that it is in this way that mortals nurse and
nurture the things that grow and specially construct things that do not grow

60

This

nursing and nurturing is an essential relationship that ties us to our progenitors more
originally than any kind of logos apophantikos or rationality. Loving and caring become

Heidegger What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 98.
Ibid.
59 Ibid., p. 99.
60 Heidegger
Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 149.
57
58
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more primary than logic and concepts. We also engage ourselves in art, a special mode
of techne, to reveal and create things that do not grow in nature. But metaphysical
thinking has long privileged thoughts that grow out of the products of the techne than
those that grow out of physis; it favors a hydroelectric plant as achieved by technology
more than the Rhine river as shown by nature.
Heidegger says that Hölderlin in the act of establishing the essence of poetry,
first determines a new time. It is the time of the gods that have fled and of the god that is
coming

61

The godheads that had gathered beings to a dwelling had fled and had torn

apart the beings into destitution

The default of God means that no god any longer

gathers men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocally, and by such gathering
disposes the world s history and man s sojourn in it

62

What is the appropriate

response to this destitution? Reviving a belief in God, worshipping God, or practicing
religion? Maybe. But the problem with this destitution is not really the irrelevance of
God in the present secular age; it is the lack of a dwelling that was at first protected by
the gods. Whereas the gods of the religions are protected by the authority of the
religious institutions, the new gods that are yet to come, are protected by the careful
naming of the poet

To be a poet in a destitute time means to attend singing to the

trace of the fugitive gods. This is why the poet in the time of the world's night utters the

61
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Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry in Existence and Being, p. 313.
What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 89.
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holy. This is why, in Hölderlin s language the world s night is the holy night

63

In

venturing out into the unfamiliar night of the holy, the poets bring a way to be close to
our ethos and circle us back to our originary character of existence. The poets leave us
with a diagnosis of our dwelling that is uttered by the thinkers as to honestly say:
However hard and bitter, however hampering and threatening the lack of houses
remains, the real plight of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses. The real
plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars with their destruction,
older also than the increase of the earth s population and the condition of the
industrial workers. The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search
anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell.64

63
64

Ibid., p. 92.
Heidegger Building Dwelling Thinking

Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 159.

Conclusion

Here we arrive at the question that I presented at the outset: what is thinking?
Are we able to answer it yet? Somewhat. Even though we cannot see the full extent of
what thinking means, Heidegger prepares us to understand what that would mean. By
now it is quite clear that thinking is not about having an opinion or representing the
state of affairs through predetermined concepts, because these conform to the model of
truth as correctness, which purports to correspond to reality. Thinking is not mere
truth-telling, if truth exists only in the distinction of true and false. Thinking is not
about deriving the meaning of our involvement with the world only through assertion
and premises. It is not about thematizing the world into a determinate objective
existence; it is not about making the world as picture

It is not about denying

mysteries and uncertainties. It is not about finding efficiency and control of objects and
phenomena. It is not about absolute certainty. It is not about collecting facts and
keeping them at our disposal. It is not about governing and dictating all the ends
suitable to an inert nature It is not a lordship It is not an act of detached observation
It is not a counting or estimating. It is not a demanding and challenging-forth. It is not a
building of things as standing-reserve, ready for use. It is not an erring and a forgetting
of the past. It is not what alienates and uproots us. Now that we have exhausted the list
of what thinking is not, we are more prepared to see what thinking is.
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Thinking is about having an openness to the mysteries of meaning and ways of

understanding our place. It is a dwelling that lets thought be without an imposition of
grid-like structures. It is about poetizing and venturing into the danger of non-meaning
in order to understand Being. It is about truth-telling, if truth exists as emergence from
hiddenness. It is about letting beings be in finite truths without any grand goal of
unlocking infinite and absolute knowledge. It is about deriving meaning about our
place in the world through Dasein s hermeneutic involvement with things. It is about
finding our telos. It is about releasement

a suspending of willing and the desire for

control. It is about letting nature be meaningful. It is being a shepherd. It is an act of
engaged practice. It is a meditating, waiting, and pondering. It is a building of a
dwelling that merits reverence and piety. It is hearing the voice of being. It is a caution
from erring. It is a humility about our finitude of knowledge. It is what grounds us and
gives us a sense of being at home. It is a dwelling, if not a sojourn, in aporia. It is a
questioning. Yet in calling all these things thinking

are we not calling thinking

nothing at all? Maybe. But at the very least, for Heidegger, all of these are the
preparatory elements of thinking before essential thinking occurs. Perhaps this is the
best that we in our time can hope for.
Heidegger once made a curious remark: In this dawning atomic age a far
greater danger threatens

precisely when the danger of a third world war has been

Budha
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What could be a greater danger than a third world war? Global pandemic?

Climate change? Meteorites? Killer robots? All of them threaten the same kind of
annihilation of life, if not merely of the human race. And it is a strange assertion for
Heidegger to make, thought-provoking at its best and ostentatious nonsense at its
worst, that death is not even the worst thing. The worst thing for Heidegger is when
calculation is believed to be the only way of thinking. But how is there going to be any
thinking if there are no beings left to think? Perhaps Heidegger would not have
hesitated to say: if there are no beings left to think, it is mostly likely that those beings
did not think. Certainly, a curious assertion. It is perhaps opportune to recall Nietzsche:
Our highest insights must

and should sound like follies and sometimes like crimes

when they are heard without permission by those who are not predisposed and
predestined for them.

2

Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. by John M. Anderson and Hans Freund (New York: Harper &
Row, 1966), p. 50.
2 Nietzsche, Beyond Good & Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, §30, p. 42.
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